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BRINGING CANDOR TO CHARITABLE SOLICITATIONS 
DAVID ADAM FRIEDMAN* 
 The American public donates a staggering amount of money to 
nonprofit charities.  These charities routinely solicit and receive 
money from donors for specific, earmarked purposes.  Often, how-
ever, charities ignore their obligations to use money for these des-
ignated uses.  In many circumstances, even a seemingly benign re-
direction of earmarked gifts for other charitable purposes could 
constitute fraud and misrepresentation. 
 Breaking the implicit or explicit promise to use money in a des-
ignated manner harms donors, charities, and the public.  Prospec-
tive donors assess the value of charitable donations in a manner 
similar to the way they value consumer goods and services and can 
be swayed by false claims.  Accordingly, allowing distortions of 
perceived value misleads donors when they are directing their 
charity. 
 In light of detailed examinations of charitable-organization 
spending practices, this Article will propose that charities should 
adhere to a new, higher level of candor in their public communi-
cations.  Maintaining a renewed, scrupulous approach to disclo-
sure would, in Chief Justice John Marshall’s parlance in Trustees 
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, ensure “that the charity will 
flow . . . in the channel” that the donors expressly choose. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,1 Chief Justice John 
Marshall observed that donors are motivated to give because of the “pleasing 
hope” that the charity will use the gift for the donors’ intended purpose: 
 It requires no very critical examination of the human mind to en-
able us to determine, that one great inducement to these [charita-
ble] gifts is the conviction felt by the giver, that the disposition he 
makes of them is immutable . . . .  All such gifts are made in the 
pleasing, perhaps delusive, hope that the charity will flow forever 
in the channel which the givers have marked out for it.2 
Today, as then, charities routinely solicit and receive money from do-
nors for specific, earmarked uses.  Often, however, charities do not techni-
cally fulfill their obligations to use money for those designated uses.  Dis-
honoring these claims harms donors, charities, and the public.  This Article 
will argue that requiring a new, higher level of candor from charities in their 
                                                          
 1.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 2.  Id. at 647 (emphasis added); see Allison Anna Tait, The Secret Economy of Charitable 
Giving, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1663, 1716 (2015) (noting the durability of these words). 
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fundraising communications will ensure, in Chief Justice Marshall’s par-
lance, “that the charity will flow . . . in the channel” that the donors select.3 
The American public donated a staggering $410 billion to charities in 
2017, representing over two percent of gross domestic product.4  Individual 
donors accounted for nearly eighty percent of that giving,5 with education 
and human service6 charities receiving the largest aggregate amount, a com-
bined twenty-six percent.7  Put starkly, in 2017, individual donors collec-
tively gave nearly six times more money than all foundations combined.8  
The sheer magnitude of the economic role of individual philanthropy invites 
an examination into the routine practices for raising that money.9 
Charities persuade donors through “the provision of information . . . and 
promotion.”10  Though donation solicitations differ from consumer advertis-
ing pitches that aim to induce traditional market exchanges, they seek to yield 
similar transactional decisions.11  Price points, combined with other claims, 
influence where funds go.  Charities confront this dynamic just like sellers of 
                                                          
 3.  Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 647. 
 4.  Giving Statistics, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org/in-
dex.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=42 (last visited Apr. 15, 2019) (citing GIVING USA, THE 
ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY (2018)).  
 5.  Id. (including bequests in this number). 
 6.  Human service charities, as defined by Charity Navigator, include children’s and family 
services, youth development, shelter, and crisis services, food banks and pantries, human service 
organizations (for example, YMCA, YWCA and the Red Cross), homeless services, and social ser-
vices.  Human Services, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org/in-
dex.cfm?bay=search.categories&categoryid=6 (last visited Apr. 15, 2019). 
 7.  Giving Statistics, supra note 4. 
 8.  See Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, 
https://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/ (last visited Apr. 15, 
2019). 
 9.  The demographics of giving, with lower-income and older households donating more as a 
percentage of income than others, also warrant concern.  See John A. List, The Market for Charita-
ble Giving, 25 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 157, 166 (2011) (decomposing giving by demographics).  
List’s decomposition includes giving to religious organizations, but this Article focuses on the so-
licitation practices of providers of non-religious charitable goods and services, which also includes 
religiously-affiliated providers of charity, such as Catholic Charities. 
 10.  Marco A. Castaneda et al., Competition, Contractibility, and the Market for Donors to 
Nonprofits, 24 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 215, 216 (2008).  The United States Supreme Court recognized 
that charitable solicitation and communication of information about causes are intertwined, stating: 
[C]haritable appeals for funds . . . involve . . . communication of information, the dissem-
ination and propagation of views and ideas . . . .  Soliciting financial support is undoubt-
edly subject to reasonable regulation but . . . must be undertaken with due regard for the 
reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps per-
suasive speech . . . and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such infor-
mation and advocacy would likely cease. 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). 
 11.  “[W]hen there are strings attached to donations, those revenues are essentially akin to 
sales.”  Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and its Financing, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO 
PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 15 (Burton A. 
Weisbrod ed., 1998). 
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soap and electronics.  As the proverb goes, “If charity cost nothing, the world 
would be full of philanthropists.”12 
Individual donors13 have a vast choice of charities for their philan-
thropy.14  Therefore, charities must compete to raise money.15  According to 
one model, charities compete by manipulating the “implicit price” of dona-
tions,16 reflected in the amount of the gift that the donor believes will directly 
support the expected charitable goods and services, as opposed to other pro-
grammatic expenses and other uses.17  One issue with implicit pricing, how-
ever, is the amount of money leaked to overhead functions and fundraising.18 
The implicit pricing of individual donations affects their ultimate 
amount and distribution.19  Solicitations persuade individuals to give (versus 
not give) or to choose one recipient over another.20  Charitable claims inform 
choices and substitution decisions, just like other consumer claims,21 driving 
the ultimate allocation of charitable funding.  Therefore, the candor of these 
representations becomes critical to donors, recipients, and the larger public 
interest because they shape the output of the entire nonprofit sector.  Chari-
table candor ensures that the donor’s implicit price reflects the true destina-
tion of funding and inspires confidence in charities. 
The fungible nature of money creates an opportunity for mischief—for 
charities to dishonor the letter and spirit of a promised earmarked use.  Fun-
                                                          
 12.  PAUL G. BLACKETOR, EVERYDAY USEFUL QUOTES 310 (2009).  This saying has been at-
tributed to Yiddish humorist Leo Rosten, although it also appears without attribution as a Jewish 
proverb.  John Peloza & Piers Steel, The Price Elasticities of Charitable Contributions: A Meta-
Analysis, 24 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 260, 260 (2005); BLACKETOR, supra, at 310.  
 13.  I use the term “donors” to refer to the “individual donors” who contribute the vast bulk of 
dollars, even though corporations, foundations, and other entities also donate to charities.  See Giv-
ing Statistics, supra note 4. 
 14.  In 2015, over one million public charities claimed tax-exempt status.  Brice McKeever, 
The Nonprofit Sector in Brief, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STAT. (Jan. 3, 2019), https://nccs.ur-
ban.org/project/nonprofit-sector-brief. 
 15.  See generally Castaneda et al., supra note 10, at 215–18 (discussing models of competition 
for donations in the nonprofit sector). 
 16.  For the purposes of this Article, I will use “implicit price” to describe the donor’s overall 
perceived value of donations, including expectations that charities will honor specifically-promised, 
earmarked uses of the money made in solicitations. 
 17.  Castaneda et al., supra note 10, at 216. 
 18.  See Cagla Okten & Burton A. Weisbrod, Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit 
Markets, 75 J. PUB. ECON. 255, 255–57 (2000).  Additionally, some literature assesses the effect of 
income tax policy on the implicit pricing of donations.  See, e.g., Gerald E. Auten, et al., The Effects 
of Tax Reform on Charitable Contributions, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 267 (1992); William S. Reece, Char-
itable Contributions: New Evidence on Household Behavior, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 142 (1979). 
 19.  See Letter from BBB Wise Giving All., GuideStar, and Charity Navigator to Donors of 
America (2013), http://s5770.pcdn.co/wp-content/up-
loads/2013/06/GS_OverheadMyth_Ltr_ONLINE.pdf. 
 20.  Susan Rose-Ackerman, Charitable Giving and “Excessive Fundraising,” 97 Q. J. ECON. 
193, 194 (1982). 
 21.  Id.  
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gible funding enables charities to spend incremental money on entirely dif-
ferent uses from those designated by the donor.22  New donations enable 
charities to shift funding from specific, solicited purposes to other discretion-
ary uses, or simply toward activities less attractive for soliciting donations.23  
This ability to put solicited money into one earmarked pocket in public, and 
subsequently, when the public looks the other way, take money out of that 
very pocket for other uses, disregards donor intent. 
Solicitation claims that create an implicit price gap are not easily self-
correcting.  For markets to correct false claims, donors need the capability to 
assess the truthfulness of the claim after the gift transaction.24  Donors would, 
as a general matter, find it difficult to see precisely how organizations use 
their gifts because the details of charitable operations are not publicly visible.  
An individual donor to a complex university or medical charity might need a 
forensic accountant with full access to financial and operational information 
of the organization to determine whether their funds had the expected incre-
mental impact on the recipient organization.  In order for markets to reflect 
and incorporate the charity’s actual behavior, the donor would need to ascer-
tain whether the represented implicit price reflected the true expected value 
of the donation.  Opacity makes that scenario unlikely. 
Donor ignorance of this dynamic offers no comfort.  As Judge Frank 
Easterbrook noted in a case where a manufacturer made fraudulent advertis-
ing claims to consumers about the pain-relieving effects of its product, “One 
important reason for requiring truth is so that competition in the market will 
lead to appropriate prices.  Selling brass as gold harms consumers independ-
ent of any effect on pain.”25  Requiring truth is equally important for compe-
                                                          
 22.  The charitable sector maintains no monopoly on the fungibility phenomenon.  The ability 
to flexibly deploy fungible resources contrary to promised use presents challenges well beyond the 
charitable sector, including in public fiscal budgeting and foreign-aid spending.  See, e.g., Tarhan 
Feyzioglu et al., A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign Aid, 12 WORLD BANK ECON. 
REV. 29 (1998) (explaining how fungibility of foreign aid makes it difficult to discern impacts on 
projects); Howard Pack & Janet Rothenberg Pack, Foreign Aid and the Question of Fungibility, 75 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 258, 258 (1993) (discussing how fungibility of aid “thwart[s]” donor intent).  
Fungibility concerns have been much more voluble when federal budget spending over controver-
sial causes have been at issue.  See Mary Katherine Ham, NYT Very Concerned About Fungibility 
of Money in Charity; Not So Much in Federal Gov’t, WKLY. STANDARD (Nov. 13, 2009), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/nyt-very-concerned-about-fungibility-of-money-in-charity-not-
so-much-in-federal-govt/article/271545 (analogizing concerns about transparency and accountabil-
ity with respect to fungibility and use of charitable donations to concerns about the fungibility of 
health care funding and abortion); David Saperstein, Appropriate and Inappropriate Use of Reli-
gion, in SACRED PLACES, CIVIC PURPOSES: SHOULD GOVERNMENT HELP FAITH-BASED CHARITY? 
303 (E.J. Dionne Jr. & Ming Hsu Chen eds., 2001) (“[E]very dollar in the church budget freed up 
by government funding is going to be used for religious activities.”). 
 23.  See infra Part II. 
 24.  See David Adam Friedman, Refining Advertising Regulation, 49 CONN. L. REV. 837, 843–
53 (2017). 
 25.  FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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tition in markets for donations, if solicitations are to generate accurate im-
plicit pricing calculations.  Donors are harmed by misdirection of their funds 
to non-earmarked uses.  Truth-telling charities also suffer.  The charities that 
create an implicit pricing gap through dishonest means draw resources away 
from those that use full candor in their earmarked solicitations, thus harming 
charities that honor these commitments. 
In this Article, I will urge the charitable sector to close the implicit price 
gap by self-policing a higher standard for solicitation claims.  Charities 
should adopt a revised “Donor Bill of Rights”26 that commits them to use full 
candor in donor communications, especially with respect to earmarked uses 
of money.  If successful, the sector could elevate fundraising practices with-
out incurring high compliance costs.  If self-policing fails, enforcement agen-
cies could prosecute nonprofits that employ deception to generate implicit 
price gaps.  Though serious and egregious instances of charitable misrepre-
sentations warrant and already receive enforcement attention,27 these more 
routine solicitation practices should not remain ignored.  Some of these prac-
tices may even meet the common law elements of fraud and misrepresenta-
tion, and the public should no longer tolerate them. 
This Article will proceed in four major parts.  In Part I, I will discuss the 
motivations for charitable donations.  I will further explain the concept of 
implicit pricing and how charities use solicitation to manipulate implicit pric-
ing to induce donations.  With that underpinning, in Part II, I will describe 
and illustrate the specific problem of honoring earmarked donor intent where 
donations are fungible.  I will show that raising money for particular pur-
poses, and then directing that money elsewhere, constitutes misrepresenta-
tion and fraud.  I will also explore the problems created by fungibility in a 
variety of contexts and the associated deficiencies in the current Donor Bill 
of Rights, the voluntary code established by philanthropy watchdogs.  Part 
III will propose revising the Donor Bill of Rights to require participants to 
use full candor—to be “scrupulously ethical” in public communications.28  
Failing that, public enforcement agencies can focus resources on these mar-
keting tactics.  Part IV will conclude that increased candor will lead to im-
proved allocations of charitable funding and higher public confidence in the 
charitable sector. 
                                                          
 26.  ASS’N OF FUNDRAISING PROFESSIONALS ET AL., A DONOR BILL OF RIGHTS (1993), 
https://afpglobal.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2018-10/DonorBillofRights.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2018) [hereinafter DONOR BILL OF RIGHTS]. 
 27.  See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC, States Settle Claims Against Two Entities Claiming to 
Be Cancer Charities; Orders Require Entities to Be Dissolved and Ban Leader from Working for 
Non-Profits (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/03/ftc-states-
settle-claims-against-two-entities-claiming-be-cancer.  The FTC put a sizable sham cancer opera-
tion out of business, one that “allegedly bilked more than $187 million from donors.”  Id.  In this 
instance, the FTC alleged that the charities’ operators directed a miniscule fraction of donor money 
toward cancer charities, redirecting the operations to their self-benefit.  Id. 
 28.  OR. ADMIN. R. 583-030-0035(12) (2015); see infra note 305 and accompanying text. 
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I.  CLASSIC PROBLEMS WITH FUNDRAISING CLAIMS 
When does a false fundraising claim rise to the level of common law 
misrepresentation or fraud?  When charities outright lie and steal, they pro-
vide easy cases.29  When fundraising involves other, less-obviously mislead-
ing behavior, however, the common law offers guidance to resolving such 
cases.  The law of misrepresentation and fraud squarely addresses commer-
cial pecuniary transactions, but the principles also hold for fundraising trans-
actions.  Essentially, the fundraising charity makes representations that the 
donor should be able to rely upon when deciding whether to donate, to what 
cause, and for which purpose.30  In other words, resources should flow toward 
where donors intend them to flow.  The social importance of the sector war-
rants requiring more candor in fundraising disclosures. 
To contextualize this problem, Section I.A reviews the established con-
sensus around the varied motivations for individuals to make charitable do-
nations.  Section I.B observes that charities convey a price for their charitable 
goods and services to donors through their representations.  If solicitations 
mislead donors about the implicit price of donation, such solicitations will 
misdirect charitable giving.  Section I.C dissects a recent example of inten-
tional solicitation misrepresentation and fraud—a flagrant example involving 
cancer research fundraising, settled by the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) and the states.  Classic fraud proves obviously damaging to donors 
and the public.  Though less blatant, the damage from misdirecting ear-
marked funds bears a conceptual resemblance.  Donors expect value from the 
implicit price of their donation, and here, their donation yields almost no 
value.  Finally, in Section I.D, in order to further flesh out the challenges 
presented by funding fungibility, I offer a high-profile scenario where, due to 
impossibility, a well-intended charity simply could not use solicited ear-
marked money as directed.  Unlike routine fungibility problems, this tangle 
received high scrutiny because the intended beneficiaries were the victims of 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.  This much rarer scenario shows 
that even with the drag of candor, candid charities will have an easier time 
exercising discretion for fund use, and charities need to balance those con-
siderations when soliciting donors. 
A.  Why Do People Donate to Charities? 
As Professor Anna Tait observes, “gift-giving . . . is not solely a bilat-
eral exchange with easily-definable, material benefits accruing to each party.  
Rather, gift-giving is a complicated form of exchange that provides a donor 
with numerous intangible benefits and operates within an intricate system of 
                                                          
 29.  See infra Section I.C. 
 30.  See infra Section II.A. 
 716 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:709 
social networks and cultural norms.”31  Economists and sociologists have dis-
sected these underlying components to understand the motivations for chari-
table donations.32  A review of these motivations situates the importance of 
charities honoring promises to use funds for earmarked purposes. 
Individuals make charitable donations for a host of reasons, in addition 
to the ability to focus their money on creating specific forms of charitable 
production.  An exhaustive meta-analysis of the charitable-giving literature 
concluded, “[T]he most important forces that drive charitable giving [are] [1] 
awareness of need; [2] solicitation; [3] costs and benefits; [4] altruism; [5] 
reputation;33 [6] psychological benefits; [7] values; [and] [8] efficacy.”34 
When charities make specific representations in solicitations about how 
funds will be used, but the charity operators use the fungible nature of the 
gift to direct those funds elsewhere, they make use of several of these forces.  
“Solicitation” proves of paramount importance because approximately 
eighty-five percent of all giving follows an affirmative solicitation, such as a 
fundraising letter or a personal request.35  When donors know who will spe-
cifically benefit, this enhanced “awareness of need” drives likeliness to 
give.36  The power of solicitation combined with creation of the awareness of 
need can serve as a proxy for the power of the charity’s representation that a 
donation will be used for a specific, earmarked purpose.37 
As for “cost and benefits,” they hinge in some part on the “psychological 
benefits of donations.”38  Professor Christine Exley catalogs some of these 
“potential motives” in more detail,39 citing studies that show “people feel 
                                                          
 31.  Tait, supra note 2, at 1702.  
 32.  Tait offers a comprehensive, but concise, overview of “charitable giving as [squarely] sit-
uated in a complex gift economy.”  Id. at 1702. 
 33.  “Reputation” folds into other motivations driven by “signaling status” and prestige of do-
nation.  For an overview of the power of “signaling status,” see Tait, supra note 2, at 1704–07. 
 34.  René Bekkers & Pamala Wiepking, A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of Philan-
thropy: Eight Mechanisms that Drive Charitable Giving, 40 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR 
Q. 924, 924 (2011).  “An overwhelming body of knowledge is available on philanthropy in the 
social sciences . . . from very different disciplines, including marketing, economics, social psychol-
ogy, biological psychology, neurology and brain sciences, sociology, political science, anthropol-
ogy, biology, and evolutionary psychology.”  Id.  To focus on the narrower legal questions at hand, 
a general sweep of the literature offers context, but a summary must suffice. 
 35.  Id. at 931 (citing Bryant et al., Participating in Philanthropic Activities: Donating Money 
and Time, 26 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 43 (2003)). 
 36.  Id. at 930. 
 37.  Reputation might not matter in the earmark context if this variable purely concerns appear-
ances of generosity, virtue, and financial strength, rather than expected substantive charitable pro-
duction. 
 38.  Id. at 948–49.  The meta-analysis treated psychological benefits as a supporting magnifi-
cation of the other forces and did not separately explore the “feel-good” benefit of donations.  Id. 
 39.  Christine L. Exley, Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: The Role of Risk, 83 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 587, 587 (2015).  
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good about themselves when they help others,”40 wish to “appear[] nice to 
others,”41 and comport with “social norms.”42  She notes that “these motives, 
as well as standard economic models, may easily explain a common finding 
in charitable giving: individuals give less when there is a greater risk that 
their donation will have less impact.”43  Exley made a significant contribution 
by determining through experimentation that given these desires, potential 
donors may use “charity risk” as an excuse for not giving.44 
If donations diminish due to informational uncertainty about impact, to-
tal welfare diminishes.45  Of course, individuals enjoy utility from gift giving, 
even if some of the value may be lost in the gift transfer.  The literature about 
person-to-person gift-giving offers some context for understanding what dis-
tinguishes gifts from other transactions.  Professor Joel Waldfogel revealed 
that “between a tenth and a third of the value of holiday gifts is destroyed by 
gift-giving.”46  In the Waldfogel study, gift recipients quantified the gap be-
tween the estimated price paid for received gifts and their own personal val-
uation of the gifts.47 
If person-to-person gift-giving destroys value, why is gift-giving ubiq-
uitous?  One explanation for this behavior is that gift-giving carries unique 
social importance, and many scholars have emphasized that point.48  Profes-
                                                          
 40.  Id. (first citing James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A The-
ory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J., 464 (1990); then citing James Andreoni, Giving with Im-
pure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1447 (1989)). 
 41.  Id. (citing, for example, Daniel Ariely et al., Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation 
and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 544 (2009)). 
 42.  Id. (citing James Andreoni & B. Douglas Bernheim, Social Image and the 50–50 Norm: A 
Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects, 77 ECONOMETRICA 1607 (2009)). 
 43.  Id. (emphasis added) (first citing J. Michelle Brock et al., Dictating the Risk: Experimental 
Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 415 (2013); then citing Michal 
Krawczyk & Fabrice Le Lec, “Give Me a Chance!” An Experiment in Social Decision Under Risk, 
13 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 500 (2010)). 
 44.  See id. at 589–90.  Through experiments, she finds that study participants will weigh heav-
ily the riskiness of a charitable lottery payout against a charitable payout for themselves.  Id. 
 45.  See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).  When information asymmetry about non-commod-
ity goods (like used cars) pervades a market, buyers may value the goods at a price lower than that 
of the seller.  Id. at 489–90.  The transactions that might result with more trustworthy information 
about the goods might not happen, leading to a suboptimal welfare outcome.  Id.  A risk of fraud 
drives the buyers’ valuation lower, making transactions less likely to occur.  Id.  The ultimate use 
of charitable donations may prove even more opaque than the prospective performance of used cars.  
Id.  The riskier charitable donations appear, the less likely they will occur or occur at the quantity 
they might with more informational certainty.  Id. at 488. 
 46.  Joel Waldfogel, The Deadweight Loss of Christmas, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1328, 1336 
(1993).  See generally JOEL WALDFOGEL, SCROOGENOMICS: WHY YOU SHOULDN’T BUY 
PRESENTS FOR THE HOLIDAYS (2009). 
 47.  Waldfogel, supra note 46, at 1330–33. 
 48.  In his original study, Waldfogel did not address the social benefits of giving squarely.  See 
generally Waldfogel, supra note 46. 
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sor Eric Posner observes that person-to-person giving creates value by com-
municating “gratitude” and hope for reciprocity.49  Twenty years after Wald-
fogel’s study, a survey of economists revealed a strong reluctance to down-
play the social value of gift-giving.50  For example, Professor Alan Auerbach 
replied that Waldfogel’s conclusion that cash transfers were superior to gifts 
was “[c]learly true if one ignores the pleasure one may get in choosing or 
receiving specific gifts.”51  Professor Barry Eichengreen observed that 
“[i]mplications of a specific gift (signal it sends, behavioral impact) may give 
additional utility to either the giver or receiver.”52 
Ideally, social value would be maximized after resources are transferred 
through gifting, but “social value” proves complex to define in this context.  
People feel good about making gifts, among the other identified motives, but 
gifts given inefficiently, or based on misinformation, come at some social 
cost.  With person-to-person gift giving, the risks of giving are different from 
that of the charitable donation.  The person-to-person giver has different mo-
tivations and may wish to convey sentiment as much as transfer wealth.53  
The doting relative likely knows that the cash price they paid for their gift 
might not match the non-sentimental value attached to the gift by the recipi-
ent.  After all, doting relatives receive gifts, too.  The person-to-person giver 
knows full well who the recipient is and can speculate about what the recipi-
ent might do with the gift. 
A charitable donor may, like the person-to-person giver, also be moti-
vated by sentiment.  Charities, however, can exploit the so-called “warm 
glow” element of giving.54  By framing donations as directed for one specific 
purpose, the donor can feel good about the impact of a gift.  Does the donor 
have the same giving-impact awareness of the aforementioned doting rela-
tive?  Does the donor merely want to feel good about purpose-based giving, 
but with a wink that it might not incrementally support that particular pur-
pose?  These questions prove difficult to answer satisfactorily, but more high-
quality information would certainly help the donor.  Just as an Amazon Wish 
List or wedding registry can aid a person-to-person gift-giver, full-candor 
                                                          
 49.  Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 
1997 WISC. L. REV. 567, 569 (1997). 
 50.  See Bah Humbug, IGM FORUM, (Dec. 17, 2013, 1:03 PM), http://www.igmchi-
cago.org/surveys/bah-humbug. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  According to economist Professor David Autor, “Presents serve multiple interpersonal pur-
poses.  Revealed preference indicates that income transfer is not the primary one.”  Id. 
 54.  For a discussion of the “warm glow” factor, see Tait, supra note 2, at 1711–12.  See also 
Heidi Crumpler & Philip J. Grossman, An Experimental Test of Warm Glow Giving, 92 J. PUB. 
ECON. 1011, 1011–12 (2008) (donors are motivated by both pure altruism, conferring a pure benefit 
to the recipient, and separately, “warm glow”—the personal joy of giving); Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Altruism, Nonprofits and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 701, 712–13 (1996).  See generally 
Andreoni, supra note 40. 
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disclosures about specified use might help the charitable donor, without sig-
nificantly cooling down the warm glow.  The giver-donor is free to ignore or 
discount the candid disclosures and give accordingly. 
The “wide range of possible objects of charity” naturally can overwhelm 
donors55 who ultimately must select some forms of charitable production 
over others.56  Donors attempt to make choices among causes to satisfy per-
sonal preferences,57 thus “it comes as no surprise that ‘[t]he choice of what 
to support lies at the heart of defining a strategy for giving.’”58  As Professor 
Usha Rodrigues observes, charities sell “identity” through their solicitation.59  
Taking that observation one step further, donors choose the charitable pro-
duction with which they want to identify.  If the substance of the choice lies 
at the heart of the strategy for giving, the candor of the presentation of that 
substance, as offered through solicitation, becomes critical. 
Charities and regulators have incentives and duties to ensure that chari-
table donations reach an optimal level and appropriate use.  Mitigating some 
of the risk of the potential misuse or misallocation of donations could lead to 
more donations.  One way to reduce risk is to address the implicit price gap 
that results from misuse of fungible donations.  The implicit price of a dona-
tion incorporates the risk that the funds will be used in their intended way.  If 
charities committed to more candor in their solicitations, this risk would di-
minish. 
B.  The Implicit Price of Donation and the Implicit Price Gap 
The market for donations shares various attributes with traditional con-
sumer markets, and conceptualizing donations through the lens of a price for 
an expected value proves helpful for analyzing the impact of distorted 
claims.60  The decision to donate resembles any decision to transact.  The 
donor must decide whether to give at all or save resources for personal con-
sumption.  If the donor chooses to give, the donor must decide to which re-
cipient, and if possible, for what specific purpose.  The donor also has the 
option to create charitable goods and services personally, by donating volun-
teer hours, for example.  The lower the price for the charitable goods and 
services, all things being equal, the more likely the donation, and the greater 
the magnitude of donation. 
                                                          
 55.  Tait, supra note 2, at 1708 (exploring this concept and the supporting literature). 
 56.  See generally FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF ELITE 
PHILANTHROPY 32–33 (1995). 
 57.  See PETER FRUMKIN, STRATEGIC GIVING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PHILANTHROPY 147 
(2006). 
 58.  Tait, supra note 2, at 1708 (citing FRUMKIN, supra note 57, at 147). 
 59.  Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L. J. 1257, 1283 (2011).  See generally 
Tait, supra note 2, at 1707–10. 
 60.  See generally Castaneda et al., supra note 10, at 215–18. 
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In a competitive environment for fundraising, solicitations will make 
claims about degree and concentration of impact.61  The donor will assess 
whether the charity will provide the best opportunity for making the desired 
impact for their dollar.  Solicitation claims drive the perception of the price—
the implicit price of the donation.62  Fraudulent or misleading claims attempt 
to lower the apparent implicit price in order to induce a donation, a larger 
donation, or cause the donor to choose their charity over a rival.  These trou-
blesome claims might be made for the purpose of personal self-enrichment 
of the charity operators, as in the case of the cancer scam described below,63 
or they may merely be made as a more benign, yet still troublesome, puffed 
attempt to induce a donation to one “legitimate” charity over another. 
Merely puffed-up representations may not appear as damaging to dona-
tion markets.  Competition based on false claims, however, leads donors to 
make choices not in accord with their wishes, causing them injury.64  Also, 
honest charities, presenting lower, but truthful, apparent implicit prices, lose 
out to the less honest charities.65 
Put differently, where donors have the “ability to contract”66 with char-
ities for the production of specific charitable goods and services, the implicit 
price of the donation lowers, making giving more attractive.67  That is, when 
donors have contractual-like confidence that a donation will support a spe-
cific purpose rather than a broader purpose, the resulting lower implicit price 
should induce more donations for that purpose.68  Like other goods and ser-
vices, the demand for charitable goods and services exhibits price elasticity.69  
                                                          
 61.  See, e.g., ROBIN HOOD, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2016), http://2016.robinhood.org/as-
sets/pdfs/Robin-Hood-Annual-Report-2016.pdf (“At the heart of Robin Hood’s grant making pro-
cess is our rigorous metrics, a disciplined system to carefully analyze each grant to determine its 
benefit-cost ratio.”). 
 62.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 63.  See infra Section I.C. 
 64.  The California Supreme Court recognizes this premise in markets for goods:  
For each consumer who relies on the truth and accuracy of a label and is deceived by 
misrepresentations into making a purchase, the economic harm is the same: the consumer 
has purchased a product that he or she paid more for than he or she otherwise might have 
been willing to pay if the product had been labeled accurately.  This economic harm—
the loss of real dollars from a consumer’s pocket—is the same whether or not a court 
might objectively view the products as functionally equivalent. 
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 890 (Cal. 2011).  I extend this to the market for 
charitable goods and services. 
 65.  As one Nobel Laureate famously observed, dishonest practices tend to prevail over honest 
practices, if left unchecked.  See Akerlof, supra note 45, at 488, 495. 
 66.  See generally Castaneda et al., supra note 10 (using the term “ability to contract”). 
 67.  Id. at 216. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See generally Peloza & Steel, supra note 12 (discussing a meta-analysis of studies of the 
impact of tax-deductibility on giving). 
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Donors are willing to give more to charity at a lower price.70  When the im-
plicit price appears higher or lower for any reason, the price elasticity should 
determine amount and incidence of donations. 
To attract more donations, charities can manipulate the apparent implicit 
price, while not altering any previously-committed spending targets on con-
tracted charitable production.  A charity can compete for dollars by contract-
ing with donors to use money for specific purposes, even if additional money 
ultimately does not incrementally increase the charity’s planned budget line 
for that specific purpose.71  The charities can use attractive donation targets 
as a low implicit price to lure fungible contributions or declare that they will 
not put the funds to less attractive-appearing use, like overhead spending.72  
Organizations can still redirect incrementally-raised money to support other, 
less market-attractive, activities.73  The fungible nature of money enables 
charities to deviate from assurances made in solicitation claims to reflect the 
charity’s preferential uses.74 
If the implicit price reflects an accurate donor understanding of the im-
pact of a donation in creating charitable goods and services, the donation 
transaction will clear.  A donor interested in supporting the local hospital may 
be content giving a gift for general use, even knowing that some of the money 
might be spent on widening parking spaces for surgeons, rather than on extra 
staffing for the burn unit.  The implicit price might be right, if all is known 
and disclosed.  Another donor might have different preferences.  For this do-
nor, a general gift to one hospital would lose out to a gift dedicated to a burn 
unit at a different hospital, again, because the donor is seeking out the lowest 
implicit price for creating the charitable goods and services they seek. 
An implicit price gap emerges when a charity makes a false claim or 
obscures a claim that artificially makes the implicit price appear lower.  When 
the apparent price deviates downward from what the price would be without 
the false or obscured claim, a gap appears that, if left uncorrected, will lead 
to market distortions.75  In the case of a complete fraud, discussed in the next 
                                                          
 70.  For a broader discussion of the centrality of tax incentives to the “modern charitable bar-
gain,” see Tait, supra note 2, at 1700–02. 
 71.  See, e.g., infra Section II.B.1 (discussing GiveWell’s analysis of Aravind Eye Care System 
and Smile Train). 
 72.  The overhead spending issue sparked a debate due to its centrality to certain fundraising 
efforts and effectiveness measurement.  See infra Section II.B.2. 
 73.  See infra Section II.B. 
 74.  “[M]oney is in fact different from other social goods: more fungible, remarkably mobile, 
and highly transferable . . . .”  VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 214 (1994).  
The concept of fungibility of money applies across many dimensions and social constructs, includ-
ing welfare relief and personal budgeting.  See generally id. at 170–98 (discussing budgeting and 
“earmarking”). 
 75.  Market failures emerge when “consumers lack information about the quality or nature of a 
product, and therefore cannot make utility-maximizing purchasing decisions.”  ROBERT S. PINDYCK 
& DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 290 (3d ed. 1995).  See generally Akerlof, supra note 
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Section, the implicit price gap would be infinite because no charitable pro-
duction happens at any price.76 
In contrast, in the case of overshooting a fundraising target without ill 
intent, as in the disaster relief example in Section I.D.,77 the challenge for the 
charity rests in honoring the represented implicit price given changed circum-
stances.78  The charity can aim to create an equivalent or close substitute for 
the promised charitable production via cy pres79 or offer to return the dona-
tion.  The better the charity’s efforts, and the more transparent, the stronger 
the donors’ confidence should be.  Charities can close the implicit price gap 
with an open and demonstrated commitment to candor.  Closing the implicit 
price gap leads to an environment where donor wishes match more closely 
with charitable production, and honest charities prevail. 
C.  Problems with “Ill-intended” Fundraising Claims 
An outrageous case of charitable fraud provides a clear starting point for 
examining the basic principles behind implicit price and the need to close the 
implicit price gap.  The pursuit of troublesome fundraising claims involves 
making tradeoffs about directing energies at singular, obvious, prolific cases, 
while also ensuring that routine fundraising efforts maintain integrity.  
Though I focus more on the trouble invoked by the more routine cases in-
volving earmarks and fungibility, the spectacular fraud of Cancer Fund of 
America starkly illustrates the harm that results from false fundraising 
claims. 
When the charitable offering has zero value, enforcement agencies can 
act with easy justification.  If the implicit price exceeds zero, donors suffer 
injury from having their money misdirected to scammers, rather than directed 
towards generating the charitable output that they expected.  Dissection of a 
large-scale charitable fraud also can reveal a clear picture of the social costs 
of any lesser lapse of solicitation integrity, including misdirected earmarked 
funds. 
When a charity functions like a racket, all solicitations constitute fraud 
and misrepresentation, and FTC v. Cancer Fund of America80 provides an 
extreme baseline for illustrating the concept of the implicit price gap.  This 
scam resulted in “the largest joint enforcement action ever undertaken by the 
                                                          
45, at 488.  For a specific illustration, see Dhruv Grewal & Larry D. Compeau, Comparative Price 
Advertising: Informative or Deceptive?, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 52, 54–56 (1992) (docu-
menting a meta-analysis of welfare losses resulting from bad-faith manipulation of discount pric-
ing). 
 76.  See infra Section I.C. 
 77.  See infra notes 102–115 and accompanying text. 
 78.  See infra Section I.D. 
 79.  See infra Section I.D (discussing the cy pres doctrine). 
 80.  No. 2:15-cv-00884-NVW (D. Ariz. filed May 18, 2015). 
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FTC and state charity regulators.”81  The enforcement agencies alleged that 
four nonprofits conned $187 million from donors who expected to support 
cancer sufferers.82 
Fungibility abuse does not leap out as the primary way to characterize 
this scam.  All of this donated money, however, was fungible enough to line 
the pockets of the operators and for years evade detection, even at the high 
volume of activity and visibility required to raise such funds.83  According to 
the complaint, the defendant “sham charities” and associated individual de-
fendants “engaged in a massive, nationwide fraud.”84  They told potential 
donors “that their contributions [would] help people suffering from cancer, 
but instead, [spent] the overwhelming majority of donated funds supporting 
the Individual Defendants, their families and friends, and their fundraisers.”85  
The defendants used a well-developed accounting scheme to “appear to be 
larger [in size] and more efficient with donors’ dollars than they actually 
were, deceiving the donating public.”86 
The expressed fundraising purposes were broadly focused around sup-
porting cancer patients, including children, and specifically, patients with 
breast cancer.87  The operators effectively recognized that by making specific 
representations about where solicited funds would go, they could lower the 
apparent implicit price of donations, thus attracting more money.  The cancer 
charities described “specific programs that donors’ contributions supposedly 
would support” such as pain medication for children, patient transportation 
to chemotherapy, and hospice care.88  As the FTC and state plaintiffs put it 
in the Complaint, “These were lies.”89  None of these specific programs ex-
isted, the promoters used them to draw funding, or more bluntly, scam fund-
ing.90 
Unlike the more benign-appearing, fungibility-focused instances ex-
plored below—where donations effectively support the charitable institution, 
but just not in the manner advertised—the donations in this case did not assist 
                                                          
 81.  Press Release, FTC, supra note 27.  The action involved all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Complaint at 15, FTC v. Cancer Fund of Am., No. 2:15-cv-00884-NVW (D. Ariz. May 18, 
2015). 
 85.  Id.  Even with legitimate charities, fundraising expenses raise controversy, but this example 
reaches beyond the pale.  See Overhead Ratios Are Essential for Informed Giving, 
CHARITYWATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/charitywatch-articles/overhead-ratios-are-essen-
tial-for-informed-giving/133 (last visited Apr. 18, 2019) (discussing fundraising and overhead ex-
penditures). 
 86.  Complaint, supra note 84, at 16. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
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cancer patients or serve any other means of charity.91  Instead, the donations 
flowed to the pockets of private individuals for their own ill-gotten gain.  As 
the complaint put it, the “diversion of charitable funds . . . deceived donors 
and wasted millions of dollars that could have been spent as donors intended, 
to help Americans suffering from cancer.”92 
The Cancer Fund of America matter starkly presents two dynamics that 
coincide with false solicitation claims, both evident in other fungible money 
scenarios.93  First, the scammers here expertly marketed their charity to ap-
peal to people who wanted to have an incremental impact on cancer patients 
in concrete ways.  Second, money donated at a falsely-low implicit price di-
verted money away from where donors thought it would go, defeating the 
honest players in the market who could also deliver like charitable goods and 
services.94 
An opportunity to help alleviate pain for suffering children, for example, 
presents a low implicit price for creating more of that charitable good than a 
broader, unrestricted donation to a charity like the American Cancer Society.  
It appears that the true budget for child pain relief in Cancer Fund of America 
was fixed, but fixed near zero.  Although magnitude of the implicit price gap 
is nearly infinite due to the fraud, the concept of the implicit price gap is the 
same as if the charity truly fixed the budget for children’s medication at 
$10,000,000 and stole the rest.95  If a charity solicited incremental money for 
child pain relief, and the incremental money was spent elsewhere, like on 
large grants to establish research centers, this practice would dishonor the 
promoted implicit price. 
Cancer Fund of America presents a pure form of fraud and misrepresen-
tation in solicitation, as the charity absolutely intended to make false prom-
ises about use of funds.  However, as discussed in the next Section, some 
charities intend to keep promises about spending, but due to unanticipated 
circumstances, cannot keep them.  These charities do, however, attempt to 
close the unanticipated implicit price gap, and their efforts tell us about the 
importance of matching donor intent to use.  Although fungible money could 
be put to other charitable uses, when a solicited cause becomes overfunded 
in a sudden manner, some charities seek to find the best, if still imperfect, 
way to honor intent. 
                                                          
 91.  In this case, less than three percent of the raised money reached cancer patients.  See 
“Sham” Cancer Charities Settle Massive Fraud Case, CBS NEWS (Mar. 30, 2016), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sham-cancer-charities-settle-massive-fraud-case/. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  For detailed illustrations of these scenarios, see infra Section II.B. 
 94.  See Akerlof, supra note 45, at 488. 
 95.  Assume that even a legitimate cancer fund would cap the budget somewhere because a 
certain amount would more than cover any need.  Only so many children need medication funding 
during any given period. 
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D.  Problems with “Well-Intended” Fundraising Claims 
Sometimes, charities can actually use the fungibility of donated money 
to help donors realize their implicit price, rather than use fungibility as a de-
vice to enable the charity to break a promise quietly.  After the honoring of a 
well-intended charitable promise becomes impracticable or impossible, prin-
ciples of cy pres96 can support putting that money to use in a similar fashion.97 
In the immediate aftermath of unprecedented tragic events, like extreme 
natural disasters or terrorist attacks, carefully-crafted fundraising appeals and 
targeted fundraising goals may appear less important in light of the immedi-
acy and uncertain dimensions of need.  These circumstances can lead to the 
application of cy pres, which “contemplates an application [of the gift] ‘as 
near as possible’ to that specified by the donor.”98  Here, unlike the chal-
lenges presented in some instances of cy pres, significant time has not lapsed 
to render the original gift too outdated to implement.99 
As has been long observed, “[t]he ideal charitable gift clearly expresses 
the donor’s intention, yet is flexible enough to be accommodated to later rad-
ical changes in the circumstances surrounding the gift.  But all too often these 
gifts are impulsively conceived, indefinitely expressed and planned with lam-
entable shortsightedness.”100  In a time-pressured, high-stakes situation, how-
ever, occasionally charities can hastily solicit more funds than can actually 
be used for the intended donor purposes.  That scenario describes the circum-
stances of the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 (“9/11”).101  No discussion about fungibility of charitable donations 
would be complete without visiting this extraordinary circumstance involv-
ing fungibility. 
                                                          
 96.  The American cy pres doctrine mostly focuses on disposition of gifts from charitable trusts 
and testaments that lose their ability for fulfillment over time.  See generally, RONALD CHESTER ET 
AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 433 (3d ed. 2005). 
 97.  This Article does not delve into the thicket of cy pres but discusses its function as a post-
hoc correction to changed circumstances that play out over a lengthy period of time.  For a deeper 
exploration, see John K. Eason, The Restricted Gift Life Cycle, or What Comes Around Goes 
Around, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 693, 729 (2007) (“Cy pres [is one of] the primary ‘orthodox’ routes 
to dealing with problematic donor restrictions.”). 
 98.  Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 303 n.4 (1939) (first citing 
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431 (1935); then citing AUSTIN 
WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399 (1939)). 
 99.  See Tait, supra note 2, at 1682–84 (stating the passage of time can outmode gift purposes, 
like relief help to early settlers of the West and regressive gift restrictions based on race). 
 100.  Comment, supra note 98, at 303. 
 101.  See generally Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python: How the Charitable Response to Septem-
ber 11 Overwhelmed the Law of Disaster Relief, 36 IND. L. REV. 251, 252–53 (2003) (providing, in 
the wake of 9/11, a thorough analysis of the legal options and restrictions for charities facing an 
overfunded scenario). 
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In the hours and days after 9/11, uncertainty abounded about the mag-
nitude of loss of life.102  Though the immediate financial needs for affected 
families of victims and first responders were not yet clear, individual and 
corporate donors generously opened their checkbooks to help with assistance 
through charitable organizations skilled at distributing disaster aid and re-
lief.103 
9/11 provides the ultimate example of how disaster-relief charities have 
had to contend with spending excess money earmarked for a uniquely spe-
cific purpose.104  Disaster-relief organizations like the American Red Cross 
realized extraordinary fundraising success in the wake of 9/11, raising so 
much money in such a short period of time105 that they had difficulty dispens-
ing it on the narrow terms that many donors intended.106 
In the aftermath of the attacks, some recognized that charities took in 
“too much money . . . for too few survivors for typical guidelines to ap-
ply.”107  Some charities that specifically solicited money to support families 
of first responders raised money at unexpectedly-high per-family amounts.108  
The charities were caught between honoring the intent of the donors and col-
liding into tax-exempt-status compliance problems for conferring a “private 
                                                          
 102.  In the hours after the attacks, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani expressed the over-
whelming scale of the tragedy to a global audience.  “The number of casualties . . . will be more 
than any of us can bear ultimately.”  Michael Powell, In 9/11 Chaos, Giuliani Forged a Lasting 
Image, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/us/politics/21giuli-
ani.html.  A few days later, Mayor Giuliani relayed that nearly 4,000 people in the World Trade 
Center complex remained unaccounted for since the collapse, including firefighters.  Terence 
Neilan, Hopes are Raised and Dashed About Rescue of Firefighters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/13/nyregion/hopes-are-raised-and-dashed-about-rescue-of-fire-
fighters.html.  According to the 9/11 Commission Report, 2,600 people perished at the site. NAT’L 
COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 1–2 (2004). 
 103.  See generally THE FOUND. CNT., GIVING IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11: 2003 UPDATE ON 
THE FOUNDATION AND CORPORATE RESPONSE (2003).  Individual donors gave over sixty percent 
of the estimated $2.8 billion in donated 9/11 relief.  Id. at 3. 
 104.  See Susan N. Gary, The Problems with Donor Intent: Interpretation, Enforcement, and 
Doing the Right Thing, 85 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 977, 988–92 (2010) (discussing the problems 
created by the overwhelming donor response to the American Red Cross and other organizations 
for victim-support funds after 9/11). 
 105.  A 2002 study prepared for the Ford Foundation revealed that “[fifty-eight] percent of 
Americans had given money to a 9/11-related cause . . . .  Two months after 9/11, the largest relief 
funds had raised over $1.1 billion . . . the American Red Cross stopped soliciting for its 9/11 Liberty 
Fund on October 31, having raised $543 million, by far the largest amount ever contributed in the 
aftermath of one disaster.”  TOM SEESSEL, THE PHILANTHROPIC RESPONSE TO 9/11, at 1 (2002), 
https://www.fordfoundation.org/media/1721/2002-philanthropic_response.pdf.  Even after active 
fundraising stopped, $424 million rolled in over the next several months.  Id.   
 106.  Gary, supra note 104, at 990–92.  Given the array of donation channels even to a single 
charity, and the range of intent, donor preferences became quite difficult to discern.  Id. at 991–92. 
 107.  Victoria B. Bjorklund, Reflections on September 11 Legal Developments, in THE FOUND. 
CTR., SEPTEMBER 11: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FIELD OF PHILANTHROPY 18 (2002), http://foun-
dationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/911book1.pdf. 
 108.  Katz, supra note 101, at 288–89. 
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benefit” on the families.109  “Given the other sources of aid available to such 
families, these charities were indeed challenged to find many intended bene-
ficiaries in long-term financial distress.”110 
Professor Robert Katz extensively examined the 9/11 surplus-donations 
problem.111  He identified three primary possible options that charities have 
when confronted with the benefit and logistical curse of a surplus.112  They 
can use the extra resources “for a related charitable purpose,”113 through the 
doctrine of cy pres, they can “retain the surplus for another corporate pur-
pose,”114 or they can “use [the] surplus to enrich the same beneficiaries.”115 
All of these options present means of finding the best match for original 
donor intent—intent that donors factored into the implicit price when making 
the gift.  Of course, returning the donated money would present a perfect 
match with implicit price.  Effectively, a refund could restore the donor back 
to her original position.  Such a return may prove impractical to execute, 
however.116  The cy pres related options, including organizational retention 
of funds, if implemented with integrity, would use the fungible nature of do-
nor money to honor intent. 
When a charity makes a sincere promise, but extraordinary circum-
stances make that promise difficult to keep, mitigation through a well-
matched substitute use offers a reasonable manner of honoring implicit price.  
                                                          
 109.  Id.  The Internal Revenue Code prohibits nonprofits with tax-exempt status from conferring 
private benefits on individuals.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).  
 110.  Katz, supra note 101, at 289.  
 111.  See id. at 284–333. 
 112.  Id. at 272–74.  Though the focus here is on the perception in the near-term aftermath of the 
attacks that the monies raised exceeded need, ironically, the other interesting consideration about 
9/11 was the underestimation of long-term effects and trailing needs of certain victim populations.  
See generally Kevin McCoy, 9/11 Death and Injury Total Still Rising, USA TODAY (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/09/09/911-death-and-injury-total-still-ris-
ing/71943340/; Linda Reinstein, 15 Years After 9/11, The Death Toll Continues To Rise, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/fifteen-years-after-911-
the-death-toll-continues_us_57d2fb21e4b0273330ac3e3f (discussing the trailing epidemic of 9/11 
asbestos-exposure related disease, in light of immediate assurances from the Environment Protec-
tion Agency that “the people in lower Manhattan that air monitoring showed ‘the public in these 
areas are not being exposed to excessive levels of asbestos or other harmful substances’”).  If relief 
organizations retained money, the funds possibly could have been used for unanticipated needs that 
emerged later. 
 113.  Katz, supra note 101, at 273. 
 114.  Id. at 274. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Ironically, also, for reasons of fungibility, it might be difficult to determine which donors 
should receive refunds and for which amounts, and challenging to administer repayment to vast 
numbers of donors.  Accordingly, in the aftermath of their 9/1l controversy, the American Red Cross 
recommitted to meet funding commitments and offered refunds only as part of a last resort.  See 
Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The Red Cross; Red Cross Pledges 
Entire Terror Fund to Sept. 11 Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2001), https://www.ny-
times.com/2001/11/15/nyregion/nation-challenged-red-cross-red-cross-pledges-entire-terror-fund-
sept-11-victims.html.  
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The unanticipated implicit price gap that subsequently emerged can be par-
tially closed.  Candor in communications about use of surplus funding after 
the fact can also ensure that donors are able to have input and give feedback 
that might close the gap even further. 
These disaster scenarios provide an important insight into the benefits 
of fungible use, and the associated flexibility, if permitted.  Though such sce-
narios should not be conflated with the before-the-fact earmarked charitable 
solicitations that I focus on here, they show that charities might still be wise 
to leave room to use gifts in a fungible manner.  Candor may diminish donor 
excitement about being able to contract for specific goods with certainty, 
lowering implicit price, but the benefits of flexibility to the charity may be 
worthwhile anyway.  The 9/11 experience may be exceptional, but it illus-
trates that point. 
Next, in Part II, I discuss some of those deliberate schemes to raise 
money through exploitation of fungibility.  Even when the charity is legiti-
mate, misdirected earmarked donations deliberately dishonor promises that 
factor into the donors’ implicit price. 
II.  FUNDRAISING CLAIMS AND FUNGIBLE DONATIONS 
The fungible nature of donated money becomes a pernicious problem 
when charities make representations to use money in a certain way, they ac-
tually do use money in that certain way, but money given for that certain way 
is used in any way. 
Cancer Fund of America demonstrates plain fraud.  Donors paid an im-
plicit price for charitable goods and services, but the donations effectively 
generated almost no such production.117  Fungibility-based fraud, where a 
charity conceals where gift money really lands, differs in degree of impact 
but harms donors and honestly-soliciting charities in a substantially similar 
manner. 
In the routine fungibility circumstance, the promise made to the donor 
appears to have a low implicit price.  The actual impact of the gift, however, 
is different from the promised impact and may not reflect that low price, as 
the charitable institution uses the gift differently.  When a charity redirects 
money toward another charitable purpose, the level of perceived evil may be 
lower, if the money supports some social good rather than illicitly lining the 
pockets of the operators.  Nonetheless, the charity deprives the donor of the 
information necessary to make choices and of the opportunity to act on the 
true implicit price.  In some quite common cases, the charity’s behavior and 
representations rise to the spirit, if not the common-law criteria, of fraud, 
misrepresentation, and the like. 
                                                          
 117.  See supra Section I.B. 
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In Section II.A, I review the private law that would address claims that 
mislead donors about the ultimate use of fungible donations.  From a prag-
matic standpoint, donors and regulators would require a high degree of visi-
bility into charitable operations to detect whether a fundraising claim might 
rise to the level of a common-law remedy.  However, an application of pri-
vate law focuses on the wrongs at issue.  False earmarking promises, though 
routine in philanthropic culture, can be construed as paramount to misrepre-
sentation and fraud.  Section II.B offers extensive, real examples of problem 
scenarios involving fungible spending of earmarked money, including prom-
ises to spend money on activities that cannot absorb more funding and diver-
sion of earmarked money to overhead.  In Section II.C., I analyze general 
examples of public and legal controversy about fungibility of funding, in-
volving charitable or similar purposes.  I use these controversies to provide 
more glimpses into these opaque funding practices.  Finally, in Section II.D, 
I show that the current Donor Bill of Rights still leaves room for spending 
mischief in the presented examples, driving my proposal in Part III to revise 
and strengthen this voluntary commitment. 
A.  Misrepresentation and Fraud in Charitable Fundraising 
These common solicitation practices at issue can meet the elements of 
common law fraud and misrepresentation, or come close, under the right set 
of conditions.118  This analysis raises the ethical question about whether char-
ities should behave in this manner, and from a policy perspective, whether 
regulators should maintain current levels of apathy toward this fundraising 
approach. 
For the purposes of understanding how misrepresentation and fraud ap-
ply, both technically and in spirit, to this primary context of concern, consider 
a basic hypothetical.  Acme University, a small, non-profit higher-education 
institution, sends a mailer to alumni containing a picture of a student, smiling, 
and holding a book.  The mailer reads, “Students like Sammy benefit from 
scholarships alumni like you have provided.  Please fill out the enclosed form 
and send a gift to support student scholarships today.”  Before the institution 
sends the mailer, the University trustees have already met, budgeted, and ap-
proved a maximum spending of $500,000 toward student scholarship awards 
for the next year. 
David, an alumnus who feels grateful for the scholarship he received as 
a student at Acme, donates $5,000 toward student scholarships.  David does 
so in lieu of his regular donation to a local animal shelter.  David also donates 
twice more than he normally would to Acme because the promised use of the 
money especially appeals to him.  David would have made a general purposes 
                                                          
 118.  These practices need not reach the level of common law fraud to inform an understanding 
of how they degrade donor decision making. 
 730 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:709 
gift to Acme, but the concentration of the gift’s promised purpose has low-
ered the implicit price of the donation, and the increased quantity reflects that 
dynamic. 
After receiving David’s gift, Acme University’s scholarship spending 
remains unchanged from the budget, in part because the planned student 
needs have been met.  Also, perhaps, Acme determined that the institution 
would benefit more from investment in other line items less attractive for gift 
solicitation—for example, information-technology upgrades—and decides to 
shift the incremental impact of David’s gift there.  Acme University could 
claim that David’s gift supported or subsidized the $500,000 budget line, but 
in reality, David’s gift made no marginal difference to scholarship spending.  
The gift supplied $5,000 of fungible resources that could be spent ultimately 
on any University need, while not increasing spending on the charitable good 
that Acme promised David. 
When a charity solicits money by making promises to use the money in 
a certain way, without any intent to have that money make the marginal im-
pact promised, donor resources are misallocated, which in a marketplace, 
yields inefficient allocations of resources.  Acme University, through provi-
sion of incomplete information (or misinformation), draws money away from 
other charities—and more money than it would with wholly-truthful repre-
sentations.  Further, such practices harm individual donors who seek to real-
ize personal charitable preferences with their personal resources and beyond 
that, of course, to maximize personal utility—with charity among many items 
of potential consumption.  The hypothetical charity, Acme University, low-
ered the apparent implicit price, presenting donor David with information 
that caused him to give money to them, and to give them more of it.  David’s 
actual charitable consumption now deviates from his preferred levels and av-
enues of consumption, charitable and otherwise. 
A broad review of the elements and doctrine of misrepresentation and 
fraud, provided next, contextualizes these fundraising practices.  Regulators 
can prosecute fraudulent representations under federal and state consumer 
protection laws,119 but individuals also have private remedies associated with 
misrepresentation and fraud. 
Misrepresentation and fraud have a close relationship, sharing overlap-
ping elements.120  Misrepresentation, according to the Restatement (Second) 
                                                          
 119.  For an example of the resolution of a prosecution involving federal and state statutes, see 
Stipulation re Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 2, FTC v. Cancer Fund of 
America, No. 2:15-cv-00884-NVW (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2016) (settling the complaint alleging de-
fendants “engaged in deceptive acts or practices by making false and misleading claims in charitable 
solicitations in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act . . . and . . . [in all fifty states and the District 
of Columbia], statutes regulating charitable solicitations and prohibiting deceptive and/or unfair 
trade practices”). 
 120.  This Article follows the guidance of the Restatement, recognizing that many states have 
their own formulations of misrepresentation, fraud, and related causes of action. 
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of Contracts, is “an assertion that is not in accord with the facts.”121  A non-
disclosure of a known fact “is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not 
exist . . . where [the speaker] knows that disclosure of the fact would correct 
a mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is 
making the contract.”122  In the case of Acme University, disclosing the budg-
etary limitations on scholarships would correct David’s mistaken assump-
tions.  Misrepresentation claims, however, only avail if the misrepresenta-
tions are fraudulent or material.123 
An assertion “is fraudulent if the maker intends [it] to induce a party to 
manifest his assent and the maker . . . knows or believes that the assertion is 
not in accord with the facts.”124  The strictest form of intent is not required, 
however.  If the maker merely “does not have the confidence . . . in the truth 
of the assertion, or . . . knows that he does not have the basis . . . for the as-
sertion,” the assertion can be fraudulent.125  A misrepresentation is “material 
if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent, or 
if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce the recipient to do so.”126  
If a donor like David gave money with the expectations of a specific use, 
based on representations or the absence of a required correction, the donor 
appears able, at the very least, to void the gift on this basis.127 
Turning to fraud, the characterization of injury to the individual donor 
becomes at issue.  Doubtless, there are distinctions between charitable dona-
tions and consumer transactions for goods and services, but the defrauded 
charitable donor can experience injury just like the defrauded buyer.  Profes-
sors, and noted torts scholars, John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok, and 
Benjamin C. Zipursky reject the notion that fraud requires “financial loss to 
the victim, as well as gain to the defrauder.”128  They frame fraud more 
broadly than as an “‘economic’ tort,”—as “the wrong of interfering with a 
particular interest of the victim, namely her interest in making certain kinds 
of choices in certain settings free from certain forms of misinformation.”129 
Goldberg and others further suggest that fraud can be better understood 
as “[w]hen one person, through a knowing misrepresentation of material fact, 
induces another to make a decision in a transactional setting that she would 
not have otherwise made, and the decision is to her detriment, whether that 
                                                          
 121.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 122.  Id. § 161(b).  
 123.  See id. §§ 159, 162. 
 124.  Id. § 162(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
 125.  Id. § 162(1) (b)–(c) (emphasis added). 
 126.  Id. § 162(2) (emphasis added). 
 127.  See id. § 164 (noting a contract is voidable where one party justifiably relies on the fraud-
ulent or material misrepresentation of another party). 
 128.  John C.P. Goldberg et al., The Place of Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1011 
(2006). 
 129.  Id. 
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detriment is primarily loss of wealth, or some other loss.”130  Confronting 
Acme University’s presentation of fundraising information, David made a 
decision he would not otherwise have made.  He donated more money than 
he otherwise would have, money he would have otherwise donated else-
where.  Certainly, this would constitute “a loss of wealth” emerging from 
paying a higher implicit price than calculated, or perhaps “some other loss” 
rooted in the failure to have his preferences honored.131 
Though a fraudulent or material misrepresentation can render a contract 
voidable,132 a fraudulent and material representation opens the door to tort 
liability.133  “One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opin-
ion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act . . . in reliance 
upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused 
to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”134  If the 
speaker merely knows that the representation could be interpreted two differ-
ent ways, fraud liability could attach.135  Here, if a charity knows a solicita-
tion creates ambiguity concerning the funding’s use, the charity could con-
ceivably confront fraud liability.  The Restatement of Torts warns that Acme 
University could not reliably hide behind the ambiguity of the scholarship 
fundraising message. 
Charities walk the line of fraudulent behavior when they use these de-
liberately misleading fundraising tactics, but pure fraud is not the sole meas-
ure of private law for characterizing this activity.  Also relevant here are the 
torts of negligent misrepresentation and promissory fraud.  Negligent mis-
representation appropriates the standard of the “exercise of reasonable care 
or competence” in communication of information in the course of business 
transactions.136  Perhaps reasonable care would require Acme University to 
communicate with more candor or to represent that the University has 
broader discretion to use funds.  Of course, such candor would raise the im-
plicit price to donors, just as certain disclosures about consumer goods and 
services could cause buyers to recalculate value. 
                                                          
 130.  Id. at 1011–12 (emphasis added). 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 133.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537–538 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 7, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  Punitive dam-
ages may avail in circumstances involving particularly egregious behavior.  For a discussion of New 
York law of misrepresentation, see generally Edward J. Normand, Damages for Deceit: A Case 
Study in the Making of American Common Law, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 333, 361–62 (2016) 
(“Although [punitive damages] have been refused in . . . ‘ordinary’ fraud . . . case[s], . . . there may 
be a recovery of exemplary damages in fraud and deceit actions where the fraud, aimed at the public 
generally, is gross and involved high moral culpability.” (quoting Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 
497, 498–99 (N.Y. 1961))). 
 134.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 135.  See id. § 527. 
 136.  Id. § 552. 
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The Acme University hypothetical circumstances may also satisfy the 
elements of the tort of “promissory fraud.”137  The Restatement (Third) of 
Torts deems a statement as a fraudulent misrepresentation “if the . . . inten-
tion to perform a promise . . . does not exist at the time the statement is 
made.”138  As distinguished from contractual breach of performance, “prom-
issory fraud is typically concerned with lying promises, where a party prom-
ises to do something but actually has no intention even at the time of making 
the promise to do the thing promised.”139 
If Acme promises David that the University will use incremental dona-
tions for scholarships with no intent to do so when the promise was made, 
Acme may have promissory fraud exposure.  Acme could try to cast the so-
licitation as conveying a promise that the donated money will fund the line 
item labeled “scholarships,” but the concept of fungibility renders that notion 
a fiction.  This, again, assumes that Acme University knows that David’s 
donated money is fungible at the time of solicitation.  Acme could respond 
by claiming that David implicitly understood this concept when he donated 
the money and, therefore, there was no intent to breach any promise to David.  
In the end, however, David still can contend that Acme had the opportunity 
to disclose the complete nature of the intended promise and chose not to do 
so.  Even if a charity like Acme merely lacks the confidence that money will 
be used in the manner represented, and knowingly makes an appropriately 
ambiguous representation, donors could pursue voiding the donation or claim 
fraud and seek appropriate remedies. 
In sum, misrepresentation, fraud, and related common law provide an 
avenue for regulators and potential plaintiffs to hold charitable organizations 
                                                          
 137.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 15 (AM. LAW INST., Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 2014).  Promissory fraud has been recognized as a cause of action in nearly every 
jurisdiction.  Karen Sandrik, Comment, Overlooked Tool: Promissory Fraud in the Class Action 
Context, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 193, 221 (2007). 
 138.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 15 (AM. LAW INST., Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 2014).  The Third Restatement of Torts generally addresses matters discussed in 
Section 530(1) of the Second Restatement of Torts.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 530(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“Misrepresentation of intention . . . a representation of the maker’s 
own intention to do or not to do a particular thing is fraudulent if he does not have that intention.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 15 rep. note a (AM. LAW INST., Ten-
tative Draft No. 2, 2014).  For a nuanced analysis of concepts invoked by promissory fraud, see 
generally IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED 
INTENT (2005). 
 139.  Curtis Bridgeman & Karen Sandrik, Bullshit Promises, 76 TENN. L. REV. 379, 387–88 
(2009).  Elsewhere, Professor Curtis Bridgeman makes the case that courts should encourage parties 
with “a huge advantage in bargaining power” to disclose the likelihood of exercising their options 
to perform or not to perform.  Curtis Bridgeman, Misrepresented Intent in the Context of Unequal 
Bargaining Power, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 993, 1010 (2006).  In the context of charitable dona-
tions, the bargaining power of parties proves challenging to dissect contextually.  For example, there 
is only one Harvard University competing among other prestigious charities, but there is also only 
one Bill Gates competing among prestigious donors.  Generally, this Article concerns smaller do-
nors and opaque fundraisers. 
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accountable more tightly for promising to put donations to the specific use 
promised.  Given that charitable organizations have incentives as strong as 
their commercial counterparts to induce a donation or transaction, charities 
will have similar incentives to make insincere promises to do so effectively 
and in volume, assuming that their operators are so motivated. 
The most egregious fraud claims become evident from the most blatant 
abuses.  With Cancer Fund of America, the implicit price of the charitable 
donation reflected the donor contracting for specific charitable production.140  
If all was known to the donor, the implicit price might have been infinite, 
compared with the low implicit price associated with solicitations producing 
legitimate charitable goods and services.  The next category of cases presents 
a twist of the solicitation representation that proves misleading and fraudu-
lent, even though less seemingly egregious—the case where the charity 
knowingly or negligently makes a false promise to the donor about the incre-
mental impact of the donation. 
Nonetheless, other considerations avail about whether these practices 
truly amount to these common law wrongs, at least in spirit.  Perhaps donors 
wink at such behavior, knowing that they contribute to a certain cause, 
properly pricing in the risk that the resulting incremental charitable produc-
tion will not precisely match the solicitation.  That is, maybe these specific-
use solicitations, on the whole, do not withhold material information, they 
merely puff out about specific use. 
Another consideration would be that donors, per the arguments raised 
about motivation of donation, may wish to reap the psychological benefits 
from charity, and these imperfect methods of solicitation may maximize 
those benefits.141  Interference with this process might reduce incidence and 
quantity of donations, and donors’ utility or enjoyment of gifts.  Sometimes, 
people do not want to see how the sausage maker makes the sausage or how 
the magician performs a trick.  They know the knowledge will burden them 
and diminish their enjoyment.142 
Nonetheless, Joel Waldfogel’s adjacent work informs that gift-giving 
can destroy economic value when information about the recipient’s uses and 
needs mismatch the giver’s perception.143  Courts have frowned upon the 
false marketing of placebos, like seller claims that a metal bracelet emits 
                                                          
 140.  See supra Section I.B. 
 141.  See supra Section I.A. 
 142.  See Christian Turner, The Burden of Knowledge, 43 GA. L. REV. 297, 299 (2009) (“Some-
times we are better off not knowing things . . . .  We are happier, indeed better off by many 
measures, if ignorant . . . .  Despite the advantages knowledge often confers, ignorance is sometimes 
preferable because it shields us from unpleasant realities, keeps us from facing difficult choices, or 
immunizes us against attack by others.”). 
 143.  See Waldfogel, supra note 46, at 1330.  
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pain-relieving rays, even when consumers seem to enjoy the placebo ef-
fect.144  With truthful information, consumer resources might be redirected 
toward real solutions or other consumption.  Donations that a charity directs 
to the wrong place should be treated similarly because better information gets 
funds to the right place at the right implicit price. 
What is the social cost of requiring truthfulness and more disclosure 
with respect to earmarked charitable donations?  A fib that directs more 
money to the charitable sector, absent the type of misuse in Cancer Fund of 
America, may not be the worst kind of fib imaginable.  A legitimate charity’s 
misdirection of the promised incremental impact of a fungible gift likely does 
not equate to a seller’s lie about the medical benefits of a consumer product.  
Nonetheless, the fib has an impact worth consideration and assessment.  The 
social benefits from honest use of incremental money or disclosure appear to 
arm donors with more confidence, less perceived risk, and, in theory, overall 
lower implicit prices. 
B.  Earmarked Donations and Fungible Money 
In most circumstances, a donor would find it difficult, from a forensic 
standpoint, to confirm that a charity used their money to increase incremen-
tally the charitable production solicited.145  Acme University could report 
scholarship spending in a self-produced or other regulatory disclosure and 
claim that David’s gift supported the sum that was listed in that segregated 
budget account.  Acme could claim, somewhat disingenuously, that in the 
event of a drastic shortfall, David’s money would commit the University to 
spend the minimum level that he had donated. 
Perhaps Acme University could try to contend that the budgeted amount 
for scholarships does not constitute a solid institutional commitment to spend 
the literal, budgeted amount.  David’s gift toward scholarships merely helped 
to enable the pre-budgeted amount to be met, Acme could claim, or supported 
                                                          
 144.  See FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 860–62 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing seller claims that 
their metal bracelet emits magic “Q-Rays” with pain-relieving power).  
 145.  The publicly-available Internal Revenue Service Form 990 filing provides uniform finan-
cial data but with limited utility to the consumer seeking to understand or track donation impact.  
“Not only won’t [the Form 990] tell you what a charity does, it won’t tell you where it does it.”  
Holden Karnovsky, Don’t Talk to Me About the Form 990, GIVEWELL: THE GIVEWELL BLOG (May 
23, 2007), https://blog.givewell.org/2007/05/23/dont-talk-to-me-about-the-form-990/.  “The form 
was not designed primarily for the use of the general public, but rather as a document to help the 
IRS and state charity regulators to ensure that organizations remain true to their charitable purposes, 
and that private individuals do not enrich themselves at the expense of those purposes.”  Chuck 
McLean, Understanding the IRS Form 990, GUIDESTAR: GUIDESTAR BLOG (Oct. 18, 1999, 9:00 
AM), https://trust.guidestar.org/understanding-the-irs-form-990.  See generally Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter & David V. Summers, Doing Well While Doing Good: Dilemmas of Performance Measure-
ment in Nonprofit Organizations and the Need for a Multiple-constituency Approach, in PUBLIC 
SECTOR MANAGEMENT: THEORY, CRITIQUE AND PRACTICE 220–33 (David McKevitt & Alan Law-
ton eds., 1994) (describing the challenge of measuring and assessing nonprofit performance gener-
ally, even with internally available organizational information). 
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scholarships in a symbolic fashion, signaling to the University with a finan-
cial vote what the donor community deems important. 
The probability of controversies surfacing is lower than one might ex-
pect, however, due to the unlikelihood that the donor would detect any dis-
honoring of intent with the initial solicitation claim.  Due to the difficulty of 
obtaining and analyzing information, a charity can make claims of this sort 
without much worry of discovery, which is why such claims could be made 
freely.146  Some promises about use, however, cannot be fulfilled.  With ac-
cess to the right data and analytical effort, such promises reveal themselves. 
1.  Solicitation and “Room for More Funding” 
Money cannot accomplish everything—that concept has inspired art.  In 
the words of the Beatles, “Money can’t buy [us] love.”147  Putting it more 
prosaically, not every charity can create additional charitable goods and ser-
vices with additional donated money.  Sometimes, non-financial factors limit 
additional charitable production, such as actual need or use for the money.  
Earmarked donations might overfund a need. 
The charity evaluator, GiveWell,148 restates the core problem with char-
itable donations and fungibility of funding: 
[J]ust because a donation is formally allocated to a given [speci-
fied] program doesn’t mean that the charity is executing more of 
that program than it would without the donation.  Most charities 
have unrestricted funds that they use to supplement restricted 
funds; if a charity can’t, or doesn’t wish to, expand a given pro-
gram, it can often offset your restricted donation with a reallocation 
                                                          
 146.  Locating examples of undiscovered dishonored solicitation claims or difficult-to-verify 
credence claims proves impossible.  However, evidence exists in the consumer arena supporting 
that bold, difficult-to-verify false advertising claims are made, and occasionally caught.  For some 
examples of spectacular chutzpah, see FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing 
seller claims that their metal bracelet emits magic rays with healing power); Jack Ewing, 10 Mon-
keys and a Beetle: Inside VW’s Campaign for “Clean Diesel,” N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/world/europe/volkswagen-diesel-emissions-monkeys.html 
(describing the full scope of Volkswagen’s false clean diesel claims and associated machinations of 
concealment). 
 147.  THE BEATLES, MONEY CAN’T BUY ME LOVE (Capitol Records 1964). 
 148.  GiveWell is described as, 
a nonprofit dedicated to finding outstanding giving opportunities and publishing the full 
details of . . . analysis to help donors decide where to give.  Unlike charity evaluators that 
focus solely on financials, assessing administrative or fundraising costs, [it] conduct[s] 
in-depth research aiming to determine how much good a given program accomplishes (in 
terms of lives saved, lives improved, etc.) per dollar spent.   
About GiveWell, GIVEWELL, https://www.givewell.org/about (last visited Apr. 23, 2019). 
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of unrestricted funds.  That is, restricted funds may be fungible 
with unrestricted funds.149 
“[H]ow will the charity’s activities be influenced by additional dona-
tions?”150  This question must be answered to ensure that implicit price for 
an earmarked, specified donation is realized.  Incremental money cannot al-
ways buy specifically-promised incremental charitable production. 
With close analysis, fungibility problems can be identified under cer-
tain, specific circumstances.  A decade ago, GiveWell developed a method-
ology for measuring whether earmarked donations indeed met their mark, 
creating the solicited incremental impact.  The methodology asks whether a 
charity or a charitable activity has “room for more funding.”151  The first-
order question appears simple enough: In an environment where a charity 
supports multiple programs or carries overhead, “[w]ill more funding lead to 
more of the good program(s)?”152  GiveWell noted in 2011 that it has “seen 
next to no helpful discussion of the issue within academia, within the non-
profit sector, or anywhere else.”153  Perhaps this Article presents a modest 
starting point for such a discussion. 
GiveWell, as a charity evaluator, does not make any legal conclusions 
about the practice of knowingly raising money when there is no room for 
more funding.154  This is unsurprising because nobody has apparently made 
any legal objection about this solicitation activity.  Arguably, however, if a 
charity solicits and accepts the gift knowingly lacking that additional room, 
that solicitation could constitute fraud, misrepresentation, and promissory 
fraud for reasons described above.155  Charities might not use a donation in 
the directed way for a number of reasons.  Producing the designated activity 
may be limited by “many factors besides money, such as skilled labor, polit-
ical support, and appropriate target populations.  Thus, more money can’t 
necessarily be used to do more of it.”156 
GiveWell offered several real illustrations of charities that solicit ear-
marked money for causes that are overfunded.  For example, GiveWell eval-
uated the Aravind Eye Care System with high overall praise, as “one of the 
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more impressive humanitarian organizations [they] have seen, performing vi-
sion-restoring surgery extremely cost-effectively.”157  However, Aravind’s 
core surgical program, as evaluated in 2012, did not require additional dona-
tion funding to support surgeries, as fees already cross-subsidized surgical 
expenses for in-need patients.158  The impact of additional donations proved 
unclear to GiveWell, given the success of the surgical program.  GiveWell 
explained, “Revenue from for-pay surgeries subsidizes free surgeries, and 
donations are used on entirely and substantially different programs such as 
distribution of spectacles and free food.”159 
GiveWell also offered the similar example of the fundraising tactics of 
the Smile Chain charity.  Today, Smile Train laudably aims to “change the 
world one smile at a time.”160  This international children’s charity aspires to 
“provide[] training, funding, and resources to empower local doctors in 85+ 
developing countries to provide 100%-free cleft repair surgery and compre-
hensive cleft care in their own communities.”161 
A decade ago, Smile Train solicited donations with the representation 
that a $250 donation could yield one incremental surgery, thus changing a 
life.162  Apparently, this solicitation communicated to Professor Steven 
Levitt, author and blogger of Freakonomics, the idea that this promise of in-
cremental impact could be taken literally.163  Levitt praised Smile Train’s 
solicitation strategy accordingly: 
 Smile Train isn’t just smart about how it delivers the surgeries, 
it is smart about how it attracts donors.  It covers all of its non-
surgery costs through contributions of its board members.  So 
every dollar that a donor provides goes directly to surgeries.  As a 
donor, this feels really good.  I like to think about my money going 
for surgeries, not office parties.  Being able to link a $1,000 dona-
tion to four lives changed is a powerful motivator.164 
GiveWell, however, contemporaneous with these solicitations, uncov-
ered that a “shortage of skilled surgeons” prevented Smile Train from putting 
all of its earmarked financial resources toward these $250 surgeries.165  The 
organization funded as many operations as possible but still maintained a 
surplus of funding.  Smile Train used this extra money to “engage[] in other 
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activities” and make grants to seemingly worthy organizations aligned with 
the cause.166  These granted activities, according to GiveWell’s examination 
of Smile Train’s Form 990 filings, included travel missions and research.  
Though all presumably worthwhile and related to the mission, these activities 
were inconsistent with the specific promise of use, certainly as interpreted by 
Levitt.167  The claim that $250 donations created an incremental surgery ap-
peared not to match with the reality, given that the procedures funding had a 
surplus. 
With a more candid solicitation, Steven Levitt may have attached a 
higher implicit price to his donation.  If the ability of the charity to produce 
the service was limited, any earmarked donation effectively supported a dif-
ferent bundle of services, which included external grants.  The implicit price 
solicited from donors like Levitt did not factor in the solicitation representa-
tion.  Though donors may still find satisfaction with the implicit value of their 
donation, if all charitable communications carried candor, the donation might 
have gone elsewhere.  Their donor dollar may have been drawn instead to a 
charity that the donors would have valued more. 
The “room-for-more-funding” problem evokes common, visible solici-
tation claims in our culture, like the assessment of claims that you can “save 
a child for only fifty cents per day.”168  Express solicitation representations 
that commit to spend money on programmatic uses, as opposed to overhead 
uses, also prove powerful to donors, and present their own set of similar fun-
gibility problems. 
2.  Solicitation and Overhead Spending 
In their assessment of implicit price, compelling evidence surfaces that 
potential donors value knowing to what degree their funding will cover over-
head or operating expenses.169  One extensive laboratory study “confirm[ed] 
that donations decrease when overhead increases, but only when donors pay 
for overhead themselves.”170  Solicitations involving the destination of spe-
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cific-use giving heightens the importance of representations about segregat-
ing those donations from overhead spending, and the importance of under-
standing how to categorize and conceptualize overhead spending. 
As discussed below, other donor surveys circumstantially reveal that the 
destination of funding for overhead plays a sizable role in donors’ implicit 
pricing.  Though overhead spending proves difficult to conceptualize and 
may not bear on charitable productivity or impact, donors have come to view 
the measure as important information, and some cases, the most important 
consideration in their donor decision making.171  Donors do have some sense 
of the fungibility potential of their donation, have sensitivity to such claims, 
and appear to take them at face value. 
From a review of the debate, nothing seems simple about defining and 
measuring charitable overhead spending, let alone linking it to charitable ef-
fectiveness.  One revealing debate emerged concerning the practice of using 
overhead-spending financial ratios as a tool for assessing charitable perfor-
mance.  Charity watchdog groups Guidestar, BBB Wise Giving Alliance, and 
Charity Navigator united to debunk what they called the “Overhead 
Myth.”172  The Overhead Myth group conceded that monitoring overhead can 
play a part in “ensuring charity accountability . . . [a]t the extremes” because 
properly interpreted, such excessive overhead spending ratios can expose 
fraudulent activities and poor management.173  However, the Overhead 
Mythers warn that “[i]n most cases . . . focusing on overhead without consid-
ering other critical dimensions of a charity’s financial and organizational per-
formance does more damage than good.”174 
The Overhead Mythers support their concerns about the misuse and mis-
understanding of overhead information with data showing the imprecision 
and inaccuracy of overhead ratio measurement.175  Such imprecision and in-
accuracy would make it difficult for donors to use such metrics as reliable 
standalone evaluation tools for assessing implicit price.  They also cite evi-
dence that overhead spending can enhance organizational performance and 
impact and, conversely, that “underinvestment” in overhead can lead to “a 
range of negative outcomes which undermine quality [of outcomes] and sus-
tainability.”176 
Despite these problems with the metric, donor interest in overhead 
spending remains high.  Significant numbers of donors tend to maintain a 
belief that charities spend too much on activities in this category.  One survey 
                                                          
 171.  See Letter from BBB Wise Giving All. et al. to Donors of America, supra note 19.   
 172.  See id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 2019]        BRINGING CANDOR TO CHARITABLE SOLICITATIONS 741 
revealed that sixty-two percent of “all Americans believe the typical charity 
spends more than it should on overhead.”177 
Yet another watchdog group, CharityWatch,178 sharply criticized the 
Overhead Mythers’s analysis and recommendations.179  While conceding that 
“overly-simplistic overhead ratios or computer-automated ratings” have 
“limited value” when not placed in proper context, CharityWatch countered 
that “carefully considered” ratios can provide valuable information to do-
nors.180  However, CharityWatch noted that the overall lack of transparency 
into calculation and categorization of overhead activities diminishes the use-
fulness of overhead analysis.181 
CharityWatch further noted the obvious difficulties in meaningfully 
measuring impact against overhead spending.182  For example, the organiza-
tion pointed out that the Overhead Myth group defended overhead numbers 
because they included mission-critical items like “training, planning and 
evaluations.”183  CharityWatch contended that these numbers do not belong 
in the overhead category but rather in the programmatic category that gener-
ates and, thus, should not stand as a basis for defending higher overhead ra-
tios.184  CharityWatch points out that the extreme example can be revelatory.  
A donor wishing “to support a charity that makes grants to fund medical re-
search . . . would prefer to donate to a charity that spends 70% of its budget 
on research grants and 30% on overhead costs, rather than donate to a charity 
that only spends 20% on research grants and 80% on overhead costs.”185 
The Overhead Myth group’s recommendation to charities, expressed in 
an open letter, do not necessarily contradict CharityWatch’s general point.  
The Overhead Myth group emphasized the importance of assembling mean-
ingful data, improving management systems, and offering transparency.186  
The Overhead Myth group offered three paths to move toward an “[o]verhead 
[s]olution.”187  First, charities should “demonstrate ethical practice and share 
[performance] data . . . information about . . . goals, strategies, management 
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systems, and governance processes.”188  Second, organizations should de-
velop a more rigorous understanding of their true costs and results to “under-
stand[] the cost of achieving their missions,” and do so by “employ[ing] ef-
fective performance management systems.”189  And third, charities should 
“educate funders . . . on the real cost of results.”190  The Overhead Myth 
group warns that “highlighting financial ratios as [a] core accomplishment—
especially in . . . fundraising materials . . . can be at the expense of meaning-
ful performance metrics and reinforces [donor] confusion.  Funders need to 
understand the truth.”191  In other words, the Overhead Myth group supports 
additional candor—a scrupulously ethical approach toward disclosure. 
Of course, a charitable organization of any size and scale will need some 
degree of infrastructure to support and enable charitable production.  The 
question is how donors should assess the value of the infrastructure when 
they consider implicit price, especially when solicitations leave room for ma-
nipulation of spending of earmarked gifts.  Given the importance that donors 
place on overhead activities, unsurprisingly, charities have responded by 
competing for donations on that basis.  Just as price point and value prove to 
be the top consideration for consumers seeking information when shopping 
for cars,192 donors attach the same levels of importance. 
In light of the power of overhead-based solicitations, it is not surprising 
to find a few prominent and successful charities making promises not to 
spend money on overhead.  Given the problems mentioned above, these com-
mitments have raised questions, and received some scrutiny.  The aforemen-
tioned Smile Train promised donors that solicited donations paid for the de-
livery of programming, while separate funds paid for overhead expenses.193  
The accuracy of Smile Train’s representation about the way it accounts for 
spending stands apart from the general question of whether Smile Train 
spends excessively on overhead.194  The first question to address is whether 
any definitive statement can truthfully be made about overhead spending, 
given fungibility. 
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On that basis, the American Institute of Philanthropy (“AIP”)195 chal-
lenged the strength of Smile Train’s representation “that ‘100% of [their] do-
nation goes to program [and] 0% goes to overhead . . . [and] ‘[a]ll non-pro-
gram expenses, such as overhead and fundraising, are paid for with start-up 
grants from [their] Founding Supporters.’”196  Claiming that a solicitation 
will be dedicated 100% to programs and not to overhead cannot “mean that 
there are no operating costs affecting the total costs of the program.”197  In 
other words, the sum total of resources could potentially still be spent more 
effectively, including earmarked donations, in some circumstances.  Give-
Well describes this fundraising tactic as a “feel-good gimmick” aimed at 
“zooming in on ‘your’ money.”198  Or, it could be described as an accounting 
trick designed to lower the implicit price of the donation by representing a 
higher impact of the donation on charitable production.199 
Indeed, corralling a core of loyal supporters to cover overhead enables 
charities like Smile Train to claim that incremental money supports only in-
cremental charitable production.200  However, AIP clarifies that this leaves 
out a critical point.201  The overhead expenses may be “covered,” but “over-
head expenses will not disappear . . . .  [W]hat is spent on one function is not 
available for another function.”202  That is, the overhead money and the in-
cremental solicitations remain fungible, regardless of their label.203  In the 
case of Smile Train, “more donations could go toward treating children with 
cleft palates if the charity were operating more efficiently, regardless of 
whether or not some donors earmarked their donations for overhead.”204 
Robin Hood, New York City’s “largest poverty-fighting organiza-
tion,”205 makes similar claims about segregating overhead funds.  This or-
ganization represents that “Robin Hood’s Board of Directors underwrites all 
operating costs, so 100[%] of [individual and other] donation[s] go[] directly 
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to fighting poverty.”206  Robin Hood, a high-profile, sophisticated, well-re-
garded, and well-established organization,207 leads boldly in marketing ef-
forts with this overhead-related claim, even highlighting it in the very front 
of annual reports.208  The prominence of such a solicitation representation 
signals the potential importance of the overhead factor in the implicit price 
of donation.  Robin Hood wants donors to assign a low implicit price, based 
on the notion that donations will not go toward executive salaries, photocop-
ying, or plant-care service at the headquarters, but will go right toward solv-
ing the root causes of poverty. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Professor Uri Gneezy and his coauthors con-
clude from their study of how donors react to overhead that the type of ap-
proach used by Robin Hood would help organizations raise money.209  
Though the study does not mention Robin Hood specifically, the authors rec-
ommend using “donations from major philanthropists to cover overhead ex-
penses” so that charities can “offer potential donors an overhead-free dona-
tion opportunity.”210 
Bold claims about overhead and donations, exemplified by Smile Train 
and Robin Hood, evidence the recognized importance to donors of stretching 
their finite charitable dollar.  For sophisticated and reputable charities to 
make such a claim, the inference naturally follows that overhead-usage 
claims have a significant impact on implicit price.  Organizations believe that 
overhead claims will lower implicit price and increase the quantity of dona-
tions.  Whether these types of promises are kept may prove difficult to track.  
Generally, the overhead problem in the charitable solicitation marketplace 
could be resolved if charities took it upon themselves to compete more trans-
parently and openly, as the Overhead Myth group recommends.  Disclosures 
about overhead fungibility might help donors set their implicit prices more 
accurately.  If truly adhered, such claims, in theory, would help donors sort 
out the market, but the potential for manipulation may outweigh any such 
benefit. 
Alternatively, regulators, recognizing the importance and power of an 
overhead-centered solicitation claim, could perhaps establish some baseline 
disclosure standardizations.  Or, perhaps a group like the Overhead Myth 
could repurpose itself to set new best practices rather than serve mostly as a 
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warning siren.  As I later discuss, if the Donor Bill of Rights worked effec-
tively, representations about fund use, including room-for-more-funding and 
overhead issues, among others, could be clarified more consistently. 
C.  Fungible Donation Controversies 
Earmarked solicitations and overhead claims present a complex tangle, 
but that complexity compounds when a charitable organization fundraises for 
multiple purposes and causes.  Fungibility problems surface in many differ-
ent forms.  When controversies involving spending emerge, they offer an op-
portunity for a more detailed and illuminated examination of such dynamics.  
They may not prove completely representative of the vast run of problems, 
but open disputes and debates provide a useful view. 
Analyses of room-for-more-funding and misspending of funding into 
legitimate charitable activities prove difficult to find.211  Some solicitation 
approaches deftly find a way around the problem.  They market earmarked 
uses, but then, like Oxfam, expressly, but not prominently, leave open the 
possibility of shifting fund use.212 
Large operating institutions like the American Red Cross, Harvard Uni-
versity, and Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center solicit for specific 
needs, while also soliciting donations for general needs.213  Soliciting for gen-
eral needs among other needs could create the impression that if a donor se-
lects a specific need, the funding would create an incremental impact in that 
specific area.  These larger charitable organizations may indeed have room 
for more funding and engage in budgeting processes that honor earmarked 
solicitation through incremental production of charitable goods and services.  
However, individual donors may have difficulty verifying incremental pro-
duction and whether spending budgets for those specific categories had al-
ready been preset.  Therefore, problems that may lie within their spending 
practices would not readily or easily surface; so to understand these issues 
practically, controversial instances provide the best view. 
As shown below, controversies are worth exploring because they often 
lay bare more facts to illuminate the conceptual problems at issue.  A few 
controversies have emerged from organizations that expressly serve as vehi-
cles for donors or like supporters to choose among beneficiaries.  These or-
ganizations can confront problems in fulfilling their literal promises, but at 
the same time, the extra level of specificity of the earmarked promise raises 
donor scrutiny, as these cases reveal. 
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1.  Solicitation for a Choice of Causes 
Recent litigation involving PayPal and the PayPal Charitable Giving 
Fund offers a simple, but large-scale, controversy involving alleged misdi-
rection of earmarked charitable funds.214  The complaint explains why donors 
care about the ultimate destination of their earmarked use, and why intended 
charities depend on the integrity of those entrusted with ensuring the ultimate 
destination.215  Similarly, the nonprofit organization, Kiva, an entity that en-
ables individuals to help entrepreneurs through global microfinance, was em-
broiled in an open controversy that illuminated the fundamental challenges 
of promoting and then honoring implicit price.216  In both cases, the allega-
tions suggested that the organizations could have been more candid. 
a.  PayPal Giving Fund 
According to the complaint in a recent class action lawsuit, in 2013, 
PayPal, the “open digital payments platform,”217 established the PayPal Giv-
ing Fund, a nonprofit with the mission “to raise funds for charitable purposes 
online, primarily in the eBay Inc. and PayPal marketplaces.”218  PayPal then 
partnered with the Giving Fund “to process and disburse donations made 
through its giving platform to certain charities.”219 
The PayPal Giving Fund enables donors to match up with charitable 
recipients, and then transmit payments to those charities.  The PayPal Giving 
Fund website told users, “[d]onate to a cause you care about with PayPal. 
Choose from over a million charities now.”220  In essence, PayPal offered to 
serve as a clearinghouse between donors and charities, and this service 
proved successful, reportedly processing over seven billion dollars in contri-
butions within three years of inception.221  If this service functioned as ad-
vertised, PayPal Giving Fund would enhance the ability of a donor to shop 
by implicit price.  The allegations here, however, claim that PayPal failed to 
fulfill the promise of directing the money to the right place.222 
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The class action lawsuit against PayPal contends that the PayPal Giving 
Fund simply did not channel the money to the designated recipients.  The 
named plaintiffs are one donor who gave through the platform and one char-
itable recipient who did not receive designated donations.223  PayPal prom-
ised that 100% of donations would go to the charity that the donors selected 
through their platform.224  In some instances, according to the complaint, 
PayPal promised to add one percent to each donation made to charities 
through the Giving Fund platform.225 
The Giving Fund platform enabled donors to search an extensive data-
base of the charities.226  If the “charity of choice” did not appear in the data-
base, the donor could invite the charity to join the platform per PayPal’s in-
struction.227  When a donor completed a transaction, PayPal Giving Fund 
would email an acknowledgement and tax receipts to the donor confirming 
the donation to that chosen charity.228 
The plaintiffs alleged, however, that “[w]hile this charitable vehicle 
seems straightforward, there [was] a catch.”229  Donor money will only be 
transmitted to chosen charities “if, and only if, those charities have already 
set up a business account with PayPal and a separate account with PayPal 
Giving Fund.”230  If the charities did not maintain such accounts, according 
to the plaintiffs, “they . . . never receive[d] the donation, despite being listed 
on the PayPal Giving website.”231  Indeed, the lawsuit claims that “hundreds 
of thousands” of recipients have not set up the necessary accounts, but PayPal 
Giving fund “nonetheless list[ed] those same charities as potential donation 
recipients without their knowledge or consent.”232 
Further, the class action complaint alleged that upon receiving a dona-
tion, as a general practice, PayPal and the Giving Fund did not notify the 
intended recipient about the donation, let alone what they needed to do to 
receive it.233  Despite sending receipts, donors did not receive any notice from 
PayPal that a charity could not “receive the funds” and that PayPal Giving 
Fund would not give them the donation.234  If the chosen charitable recipient 
did not make arrangements to set up the accounts and then claim the donated 
money, after six months, the money would be given “to an organization of 
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[PayPal or the Giving Fund’s] choosing without regard to the intention, be-
liefs, or desires of the donor.”235 
As the plaintiffs summarized, “[D]onors put their trust in [PayPal and 
the PayPal Giving Fund] to deliver their donations, only to have their dona-
tions surreptitiously redirected to unknown entities, including those that serve 
different causes and different communities than the intended recipient.”236 
b.  Kiva 
Kiva, a nonprofit organization, seeks out to realize “a world where all 
people hold the power to improve their lives” by “creat[ing] connection and 
relationships.”237  Kiva takes pains to distinguish that participants are lenders, 
not donors, as this “creates a partnership of mutual dignity.”238  Through the 
Kiva organization, individuals can “lend[] as little as $25 . . . [to] be part of 
the solution and make a real difference in someone’s life.”239 
A decade ago, Kiva encountered a public controversy about the mechan-
ics of lending solicitation and whether the earmarked loans flowed directly 
into the pockets of the specific borrowers.240  Despite implications that they 
were, many of the posted lending opportunities had already been funded.  As 
an influential observer explained at the time: 
Less than 5% of Kiva loans are disbursed after they are listed and 
funded on Kiva’s site.  Just today, for example, Kiva listed a loan 
[for] Phong Mut in Cambodia and at this writing only $25 of the 
needed $800 has been raised.  But you needn’t worry about 
whether Phong Mut will get the loan because it was disbursed last 
month.  And if she defaults, you might not hear about it: the inter-
mediating microlender MAXIMA might cover for her in order to 
keep its Kiva-listed repayment rate high. 
 In short, the person-to-person donor-to-borrower connections 
created by Kiva are partly fictional.  I suspect that most Kiva users 
do not realize this.  Yet Kiva prides itself on transparency.241 
In sum, Kiva essentially funneled individual lender money to larger “mi-
crofinance institutions,” which supported the ultimate recipients.242  After 
this controversy emerged in the philanthropy community, Kiva responded by 
                                                          
 235.  Id. at 4. 
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bringing more clarity and candor to explaining how the nonprofit func-
tioned.243 
Before, the organization promised that “Kiva lets [people] lend to a spe-
cific entrepreneur, empowering them to lift themselves out of poverty.”244  
The representation that people could lend small amounts to specific entrepre-
neurs, encouraging these lenders to envision that their personal capital would 
help a real individual with a specific ambition in a specific place, creates a 
low implicit price.  A higher implicit price likely results if the lenders envi-
sioned their money pooling with other donations to backstop larger lending 
intermediaries.245  After this public exposure of their model, Kiva’s expressed 
promise was watered down to reflect the true implicit price: “Kiva connects 
people through lending to alleviate poverty.”246 
These past concerns about Kiva provide a classic example of the fungi-
bility problem.  Though not nominally involving directing use of charitable 
funds, the spirit of the Kiva model comes close.  The narrow representation 
of funding use created an artificially low implicit price.  Exposure of the 
mechanisms behind the operational curtain revealed that lender money 
served broader pre-set purposes, thus not technically having the desired in-
cremental impact, illuminating a higher implicit price. 
Note that Kiva did not divert money to line the pockets of operators or 
other third parties.  Kiva used the lower implicit price associated with putting 
a face on a donation to raise funding for a larger operation that would ulti-
mately support that face, just not directly.  Kiva’s model creates transactions 
that lead to social good, if they provide access to capital, good feelings for 
lenders, and general awareness about the impact of microfinance.  Nonethe-
less, potential participants have a choice in this market of how to use their 
capital for social and other purposes—or even support microfinance.247  The 
more the representations made by the opportunities reflect the true implicit 
price, the more likely the funding use meets the desires of the donors and 
perhaps finds the most effective place. 
2.  Freeing up Money for Competing Purposes or Causes 
Controversies about fungibility, generally considered, also hide well be-
cause those who benefit from the flexibility of fungible use often have a dis-
incentive to disclose their actual use.  The next two examples do not focus as 
squarely on donor-to-charity charitable donations.  They instead show the 
                                                          
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  See id. 
 246.  Id.  A search reveals that Kiva’s website no longer includes this language. 
 247.  Contemporaneous players in this space included Microplace, the Grameen Foundation, and 
Acción.  See Deanna Chea, Microlending: State Regulatory Reforms to Promote Economic and 
Employment Growth in California, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 451, 452–53, 457 (2014). 
 750 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:709 
nature of conflict that emerges when a specific use is named, but fungibility 
enables competing uses. 
Fungibility enables money (or action) solicited in the name of one cause 
to generate unexpected—and perhaps, undesired—incremental activities.  
The clash between a retailer, Meijer, the U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance activist 
group, and the Humane Society over the “Foreclosure Pets Fund” crisply il-
luminated such tensions.248  Also providing illumination on the concept of 
specific-use money enabling the freeing up of funding for other purposes are 
state lotteries.  Some state lotteries, like North Carolina’s, market ticket sales 
as a boost for education funding, when in reality, the ticket revenue boosts 
all general-purpose state funding.249 
These two different examples share a common problem.  Money at-
tracted for one cause can attract a low, but misleading implicit price, espe-
cially when the money goes to competing causes or into completely different 
pockets.  Again, these controversies may not expose classic donor-to-charity 
issues, but they provide a rare glimpse into the dynamics of fund use that 
inform the donor-to-charity, implicit price concern. 
a.  Foreclosure Pets Fund 
A conflict between the Michigan-based retailer Meijer and the pro-hunt-
ing U.S. Sportsmen Alliance presents a crisp example of the problems asso-
ciated with charitable donations and fungible use.250  The Sportsmen Alliance 
successfully exposed that Meijer’s promotional support of the Foreclosure 
Pets Fund of the Humane Society of the United States indirectly served to 
finance the Humane Society’s pursuit of anti-hunting causes.251  Meijer’s 
subsequent discontinuation of the program under pressure from the Alliance, 
though disappointing to Humane Society fundraisers, ultimately provided 
more visibility to the public into the true impact of a donation to the fund. 
During the homeowner foreclosure crisis in 2008, the Humane Society 
observed that with foreclosure-driven home evictions and other financial 
pressures, “pets . . . turn[] out to be the unexpected victims.”252  When in dire 
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financial straits, people may save money by “sacrificing pet care or by relin-
quishing or even abandoning their pets.”253  In response, the Humane Society 
set up the Foreclosure Pets Fund as a fundraising vehicle “to provide grants 
to shelters, rescue/adoption groups, and animal care and control agencies to 
assist families in caring for their pets.”254  Retailer Meijer took the oppor-
tunity to support the Foreclosure Pets Fund with a modest promotion involv-
ing donations of “$1, up to $5,000, for every entry in an online pet photo 
contest.”255 
Though a $5,000 donation to an organization receiving over $112 mil-
lion in grants seems insignificant,256 the fact that this donation could spill 
over into supporting causes that the Sportsmen Alliance sharply opposed 
proved symbolically important enough to raise the organization’s ire.  Put 
differently, the Alliance pointed out to the public that Meijer’s support of the 
Foreclosure Pets Fund would not reflect the implicit price, as each incremen-
tal dollar given by a donor could generate a dollar’s worth of charitable ac-
tivities the donor ideologically opposes, not the cause they thought they were 
supporting. 
The Alliance’s scrutiny exposed a dynamic that may have misled Meijer 
shoppers on a small scale, many of whom purchased hunting equipment and 
licenses there.257  Up front, when establishing the Foreclosure Pets Fund, the 
Humane Society expressly linked the foreclosure crisis to the broader fate of 
animals and humankind, an idea that might have raised suspicion about the 
ultimate impact of supporting the fund.  As the Humane Society explained: 
 We at The [Humane Society of the United States] have long ar-
gued that there’s a link between the fortunes of animals and other 
pressing social issues.  When someone abuses an animal, for in-
stance, it is often a precursor to other forms of violence to come.  
Or if a downer cow is abused and funneled into the food supply, 
there is a greater threat to public health. 
 Well, the issue cuts in many ways.  When people are in economic 
distress, or facing a financial loss, that often has repercussions for 
animals.  Human and animal lives are entangled in our culture, and 
when there is crisis that affects one or the other, there’s usually an 
impact to be felt elsewhere.258 
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In introducing the context for the program, the Humane Society hinted 
at the systemic impact of the foreclosure program on the broader organiza-
tional mission.  Certainly, the specified use for the raised money proved at-
tractive to certain types of donors, but the implicit price, if one takes the do-
nation at face value, like a Meijer customer might, would reflect the narrower 
promoted cause. 
In the end, the Humane Society effectively validated the Sportsmen Al-
liance fungibility concerns in their sharp response to Meijer’s pressured aban-
donment of the foreclosure fund.  In the wake of Meijer’s withdrawal, the 
Humane Society did not deny fungibility.  To the contrary, the organization 
embraced fungibility and the systemic impact of an earmarked donation: 
 Yesterday, I issued a call to raise $10,000 after the radical U.S. 
Sportsmen’s Alliance (USSA), in a despicable move, intimidated 
Meijer department stores into dropping its support of a fund we 
created to help keep pets with their families during home foreclo-
sures.  Already, supporters have donated more than $25,000—and 
counting—to help the pet victims of the foreclosure crisis and to 
save wildlife from horrible abuses such as captive shoots and polar 
bear trophy hunting . . . .  I will soon send a letter to the Sports-
men’s Alliance and let them know that they’ve helped us raise 
money for pets and for fighting canned hunts and the other inhu-
mane and unsporting practices that are the group’s favored activi-
ties.259 
Though the Meijer case study involved a charitable promotion, and not 
a straight individual charitable donation, it presents a live example about so-
licitation representations that imply earmarking of funds that in the end, the 
charity admits are for fungible use.  In this instance, the organization is not 
shifting the funding to overhead or closely-related causes, but to causes laden 
with entirely different values—for the constituents of the Sportsmen’s Alli-
ance, at least. 
The Meijer customer may go to the effort of participating in the promo-
tion with an implicit price set around the concept of helping families and pets 
stay together.  If the Meijer customer knew that participation in the promotion 
also supported other Humane Society causes, the implicit price would differ.  
For the Meijer customer, the realization of the true implicit price for assisting 
families and pets might require different efforts, like direct donation of dog 
food to shelters.  Though the political motivations magnified perhaps a 
broader conflict between two competing organizations, fungible use for 
causes other than the one earmarked sparked the conflagration, despite the 
almost negligible amount of funding at issue. 
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b.  State Lotteries and Funding of Specific Public Services 
State lotteries, though clearly distinct from charities, market a public do-
good element as part of their appeal to lawmakers and ticket buyers, in addi-
tion to selling the opportunity to achieve instant fortune.  Like many charita-
ble solicitations, this form of marketing raises questionable specific-use 
claims about their actual impact on state budgets.  Lotteries make public mar-
keting claims that revenue surpluses from their operations “fund state-run 
programs such as education, parks, emergency responders, veterans’ health 
and other services.”260  In effect, these claims lower the implicit price of this 
form of gambling by assuring that losses will be allocated to a good cause.  
Public uses of this money that deviate from such causes create an implicit 
price gap.  As discussed, the political justification for, but also the marketing 
of lotteries promotes such uses, so the power of the advertising representation 
about fund use must be weighed. 
In part, the fungibility of funding enables public lottery operators and 
state legislatures to undermine the specific-use representations made to lot-
tery customers and sponsors.  The fungibility question here has achieved a 
higher public profile as public spending data proves more accessible than 
private charitable spending.261 
One example helps illustrate the fungibility problem with respect to sur-
plus money.  North Carolina calls its state lottery the “North Carolina Edu-
cation Lottery.”262  The North Carolina Education Lottery makes quite spe-
cific representations to ticket purchasers and the general public about the 
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impact of lottery surplus money on state education services and infrastruc-
ture,263 embedded in the claim that all surplus proceeds go to the state educa-
tion budget.264  The incremental impact of the lottery on education, however, 
remains in question. 
When the North Carolina General Assembly established the state lot-
tery, the initial bill from the North Carolina House of Representatives ad-
dressed concerns about fungibility head on.  The bill first maintained that 
“net revenues generated by the lottery shall not supplant revenues already 
expended or projected to be expended for those public purposes, and lottery 
net revenues shall supplement rather than be used as substitute funds for the 
total amount of money allocated for those public purposes.”265  This language 
intended to set a budgeting rule that lottery revenue would be added to the 
established education budget.  However, the North Carolina State Senate 
struck that language from the bill.266 
Presumably, this change enabled North Carolina to have a freer hand in 
the budgeting process, but even if the Senate kept the House language, as-
sessment of the incremental impact of lottery revenue on education spending 
would prove difficult to discern in the long run.  If a lottery windfall financed 
the construction of new schools, certainly, the legislature would factor the 
existence of those schools into their total appropriations for school construc-
tion from general funds.  The North Carolina Education Lottery can make 
claims to ticket buyers and the public that the money goes toward education, 
but factoring in whether the revenue causes incremental spending proves 
more difficult. 
The above illustrations show how fungibility can enable solicited money 
to be used for radically different purposes.  Ultimately, fungibility leaves 
room for sophisticated charitable marketers to attract donors through the lure 
of a low implicit price, followed by language presented elsewhere that ena-
bles them to disclose the true use.  Or, the opacity and complexity of the 
larger organization simply provides more of a shield.  Such dynamics lead 
donors to misprice their charity, as noted, donating it to the lower-priced 
charity at the expense of other more candid charitable causes and uses.  A 
solution to this problem can come from within, through stricter self-regula-
tion of candor in charitable representations.  Failing a private solution, it can 
come from regulators.  Self-regulation, through a governing mechanism like 
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a revised Donor Bill of Rights might prove more appealing because formal 
compliance and enforcement will put an expensive, larger burden on charita-
ble production. 
D.  “A Donor Bill of Rights” 
Some charitable organizations have recognized that confidence in dona-
tion use effectively lowers the implicit price of donation.  As such, several 
organizations agreed to pledge their compliance with “A Donor Bill of 
Rights,” created by several fundraising and philanthropy associations.267  
Among other commitments, those who pledge to honor the Donor Bill of 
Rights, agree “to . . . inform[] [donors] of the organization’s mission, of the 
way the organization intends to use donated resources, and of its capacity to 
use donations effectively for their intended purposes . . . [and] [t]o . . . as-
sure[] their gifts will be used for the purposes for which they were given.”268 
A charitable organization can still promote a specific use of funding 
without formally committing to such use, yet still able to comply with a com-
mitment to honor the Donor Bill of Rights.  For example, Oxfam self-de-
scribes as “a global organization working to end the injustice of poverty[,] . . . 
help[ing] people build better futures for themselves, hold[ing] the powerful 
accountable, and sav[ing] lives in disasters.”269  Oxfam’s donation page pre-
sents rotating examples of specific uses for gift money, much like the way 
Smile Train presented impact for a price.270  Oxfam presents these specific 
uses prominently, but uses careful language in so doing.  For example, the 
organization claims that a specific donation of X dollars “can provide,” “ed-
ucate,” or “help” address the identified problems, which leaves Oxfam more 
flexibility for ultimate use than the language of “will provide” or “shall pro-
vide.”271  A click on any of Oxfam’s specific uses leads to the same donation-
capture page, briefly presenting an image of a man, presumably a potential 
beneficiary, with the general message: 
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 Now, more than ever, your support matters.  Millions of families 
are struggling to overcome hunger, poverty, and injustice.  You can 
support survivors of the devastating disasters in Indonesia, aid 
Rohingya families and others displaced by violence, assist families 
on the brink of famine in Yemen, and help people work their way 
out of poverty.272 
Oxfam also promotes its subscription to the Donor Bill of Rights, which 
“assure[s] [that] gifts will be used for the purposes for which they were 
given,”273 and the mechanisms and language certainly leave room for use for 
the general purposes listed on the donation capture page.  This general lan-
guage stands apart from specific uses that the user clicked upon to reach the 
capture page.  Oxfam appears to comply with the letter of the Donor Bill of 
Rights while retaining discretion about funding allocation.  Oxfam’s web do-
nation process invokes and leverages the appeal of specific uses but leaves 
the ultimate funding use to the discretion of the organization.  In other words, 
Oxfam deploys specific-use-like tactics to lure in funds but makes no firm 
commitments.  A standard of full candor might require Oxfam to be more up 
front about trying to raise a general pool of money for distribution at their 
expert discretion. 
The World Wildlife Fund (“WWF”)274  uses solicitation tactics similar 
to that of Oxfam, but the representations about incremental impact are some-
what softer and less specific (that is, no dollar donation amounts linked to 
specific impact) and disclosure about fungible ultimate use emerges more 
clearly on their website.275  The WWF centers web solicitations on donor 
“[a]doptions” of animals, for which they offer a vivid array of available ex-
otic species.276  This tactic makes the donation impact a bit more tangible, as 
the donor can click on one of dozens of attractive pictures of specific animals 
for adoption.  However, the WWF, in contrast to Oxfam, conspicuously rep-
resents that the adoptions are “symbolic” only.  They are indeed called “Sym-
bolic Species Adoptions,”277 and the adoptions are without specific impact 
on any animal, or even any particular species.  WWF discloses, albeit less 
vividly and conspicuously than the heartrending pictures of the creatures up 
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for adoption, that “[y]our donation provides general support to World Wild-
life Fund, a 501(c)(3) charitable organization.  [Eighty-four] percent of 
WWF’s spending is directed to worldwide conservation activities.”278 
Charitable appeals, expressly promoting earmarked use, while also ex-
pressly disclaiming the earmark restriction, echo other areas of consumer 
marketing practices.  Regulation of consumer claims presented alongside 
simultaneous disclaimers varies by context.  For example, under FTC guide-
lines, a seller can lawfully declare an item “free,” as long as the terms, con-
ditions, and obligations required for the consumer to realize the “free” price 
are disclosed.279  Such a rule provides permission for a seller to make a con-
tradictory claim, perhaps a claim more contradictory than the charitable rep-
resentations.  On the other hand, the drafters of the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act280 set out to attack contradictory language about simultaneous seller 
warranty claims and disclaimers.281  In drafting Magnuson-Moss, the House 
Committee reported concern that “in many cases where a warranty or guar-
antee was ostensibly given the old saying applied ‘The bold print giveth and 
the fine print taketh away.’”282  As noted above in the description of the 
Oxfam website, the Oxfam lead-in induces the donor with a narrow solicita-
tion claim, but the subsequent disclosure upon click-through “taketh away” 
the implied spending restrictions.283 
FTC guidance on the use of the word “free” permits a degree of express 
seller contradiction, and if the charitable solicitation norms leaned that way, 
both the Oxfam and the WWF representations would pass the test.  Mag-
nuson-Moss, however, attacks and rejects such contradiction with warranties 
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for consumer goods.  Claims of earmarked use, when coupled with a dis-
claimer, would likely find disfavor under the spirit of the Magnuson-Moss 
approach. 
The Magnuson-Moss approach appears to fit the charitable-solicitation 
problem better than the free approach.  With the free pricing regime, the con-
sumer, though put at some risk of confusion, has an opportunity to tally and 
verify the total price before completing the transaction.  Warranties, in com-
parison, in practice, reveal more of their content in the future and unlike price, 
the consumer may not confront the warranty’s meaning at the point of trans-
action.  Therefore, the opacity associated with the use of earmarked funds 
may closely resemble warranties for consumer goods, thus the standard for 
charitable solicitations should lean more toward the spirit of the concerns that 
led to the enactment of Magnuson-Moss.  Deception should be construed 
more broadly for difficult-to-verify claims about specific use. 
In sum, WWF exemplifies an attempt to lower implicit price by making 
potential uses more vivid—evoking notions of specific use but simultane-
ously clarifying that donations can be used for “general support” of the or-
ganization.284  Oxfam apparently attempts to lower implicit price by present-
ing specific uses and showing the incremental impacts of dollar amounts to 
specific uses, in the manner of Smile Train.285  Ultimately, an accurate im-
plicit price should reflect the broad discretion that Oxfam retains to spend 
donations on the worthy specific causes promoted by the charity.  In both 
cases, enhanced candor in charitable communications would help donors 
make informed assessments of impact. 
Though deficient, the current approach toward self-regulation of chari-
table-solicitation representations contains the seeds of realistic proposals for 
reform of these practices.  Next, I discuss how a revised Donor Bill of Rights 
could be the centerpiece of an initial effort to bring candor to charitable com-
munications. 
III.  PROPOSALS FOR CHARITABLE SOLICITATION REFORM 
Bringing candor to the solicitation process when funding is fungible can 
help all honest charitable causes, while enhancing donor confidence in char-
ities.  Requirements of more disclosure would change the way organizations 
solicit money and might shape how organizations use money.  However those 
changes pan out, the incremental impact of a donor’s gift will more closely 
reflect the donor’s intentions. 
The need for extra candor in charitable solicitation representations, par-
ticularly where fungibility surfaces as an issue, results from the difficulty of 
market correction of the claim, which I explain in Section III.A.  In Section 
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III.B, I suggest an addition to the Donor Bill of Rights: a more robust com-
mitment of candor in solicitations and communications, to ensure that spe-
cific-cause solicitations meet or exceed donor expectations for use.  Self-po-
licing of communications, with the assistance of philanthropy watchdog 
groups, will ensure that money finds the channel that donors expect.  Finally, 
Section III.C prescribes a last resort path for regulatory intervention.  The 
costs of regulatory compliance alone make this option less attractive, but the 
prospect, along with risks of civil liability and public-relations exposure, 
should incentivize the sector to embrace the “candor commitment.” 
A.  Enhancing the Integrity of Fungible Solicitation Claims 
Though the approach taken here focuses on the concept of implicit pric-
ing, charitable solicitation claims usually frame a promised impact.  That 
promised impact can be general, like a no-strings-attached donation to a uni-
versity.  That promised impact can be specific, as in “twenty dollars can feed 
this particular child in a particular remote village for one week.”  Consumers 
have difficulty sorting out these claims in the same way they have trouble 
sorting out claims about the need for auto repairs, claims about a product’s 
environmental impact, or pain relief from wearing a bracelet.286  All of these 
claims prove expensive to verify relative to the price of the purchase. 
These types of advertising claims exemplify “credence claims,” often 
the types of claims that concern regulators the most.287  Advertising claims 
can be characterized as falling into three categories—search, experience, and 
credence—with each raising different levels of concern about whether con-
sumer markets can correct them without intervention.288 
Search claims involve seller claims about price, category of item, and 
availability.289  In the charitable context, a search claim might be, “We are a 
nonprofit higher-education charity.”  These claims prove comparatively in-
expensive for a donor to verify in advance of a gift, should the donor so 
choose.290  Experience claims involve claims about quality that can be veri-
fied after a transaction.291  In the charitable context, an experience claim 
might be, “Your donation will pay for a late-applying child named Taylor to 
attend a private academy for free, even though the academy has never seated 
more than twenty students.”  The donor can verify after the gift whether that 
student named Taylor enrolled for free as the twenty-first student.292 
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 287.  Id. at 859. 
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Credence claims, however, encompass most of the potential claims that 
charities make where resources are fungible and verification proves expen-
sive.  In the world of consumer protection enforcement, credence claims of-
ten take enforcement priority.293  Consumers find credence claims challeng-
ing to test, as they never openly indicate that they were unfulfilled.294  
Therefore, consumers will not adjust behavior based on false credence 
claims, meaning that markets alone are not well-situated to punish those sorts 
of claims as swiftly.  False credence claims can prevail over more honest 
claims.295  The same applies for charitable markets, where the element of 
trust in charities and the faith in their regulatory oversight may be higher.  
Though an argument has been made that rational advertisers would never in-
vest in credence claims because consumers would not attach value to unver-
ifiable information, empirical evidence indicates that they proliferate.296 
Smaller individual donations, in particular, are of concern in this dy-
namic because the cost of investigation rapidly exceeds the potential value of 
the gift.  Larger solicited donations might instigate the donor to investigate 
or at least indicate that the donor has resources and ability to inspect.  A uni-
versity donor endowing a five-million-dollar chaired professorship in com-
puter science may have the resources to investigate and extract necessary 
guarantees about incremental impact.  A twenty-five-dollar donor to a uni-
versity for scholarship funding, on the other hand, must take it on faith that 
the donation will have an incremental effect, or simply discount the represen-
tation. 
Charities that solicit honestly and with full candor may carry a higher 
implicit price than those credibly generating the same charitable production 
with less candor and more persuasive tricks in their solicitation.  The nature 
of credence claims indicates that nobody will check them, and they will not 
self-correct.  In order for a charity to compete for the donation dollar, a char-
ity will have to cut corners in their solicitations the same way that their com-
petitors might.  If leading charities cut corners, less sophisticated charities 
will have fewer choices. 
Therefore, the first step that leading charities can make, along with guid-
ance, credentialing, and monitoring from leading philanthropy watchdogs, 
would be to strengthen their obligations of candor.  The current Donor Bill 
of Rights offers a framework that can support a renewed commitment by 
charities to either honor their representations about incremental impact or to 
represent how they handle their money with full candor. 
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B.  Adding Candor Commitments to the Donor Bill of Rights 
The Donor Bill of Rights, written by fundraising-professional organiza-
tions in 1993297 and adopted by a range of prominent nonprofits,298 provides 
a ready framework for clarifying the rules and establishing new norms about 
fundraising practices.  Although the Association of Fundraising Professionals 
incorporated electronic-focused additions in an “e-donor Bill of Rights,”299 
some nonprofit sector leaders have observed that after twenty-five years, the 
Donor Bill of Rights may be ripe again for revision and amendment.300 
The preamble of the Donor Bill of Rights enables charities to adopt a 
view of philanthropy that honors donor intent and recognizes the important 
of donor “confidence”: 
Philanthropy is based on voluntary action for the common good. It 
is a tradition of giving and sharing that is primary to the quality of 
life.  To assure that philanthropy merits the respect and trust of the 
general public, and that donors and prospective donors can have 
full confidence in the not-for-profit organizations and causes they 
are asked to support, we declare that all donors have these 
rights . . . .301 
The ten articles of the Donor Bill of Rights generally focus on donor 
ability to “[t]o be informed” about and “[t]o have access” to the charity.302  
Articles I and IV, particularly, offer general, broad commitments about the 
information rights related to the use of donations.  Through adoption, signa-
tories agree that donors have the right “[t]o be informed of . . . the way the 
organization intends to use donated resources, and of its capacity to use do-
nations effectively for their intended purposes.”303  Note that room-for-more-
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funding issues have already been acknowledged by the prominent fundrais-
ing groups. 
Further, the Donor Bill of Rights maintains that donors are “[t]o be as-
sured their gifts will be used for the purposes for which they were given.”304  
This latter question raises, albeit obliquely, the question of disclosures about 
fungible use of money and whether the charity will use a donation to truly 
produce the expected incremental production reflected in the implicit price. 
If philanthropy watchdogs reopen the Donor Bill of Rights, they should 
first consider whether certain solicitation practices with respect to fungibility 
remain consistent with the spirit of the Donor Bill of Rights as written.  The 
Donor Bill of Rights leaves open wiggle room for charities to define what 
“capacity” means, for example.  Did Smile Train properly represent “capacity 
to use donations effectively”?  Smile Train could respond that spending on 
like causes other than surgery would be an effective use. 
Also, the word “purposes” could be construed broadly.  As noted in de-
tail throughout this Article, an organization can use fungibility as a means for 
claiming that donated money flowed to its purposes, if the organization es-
chews incremental impact as the measurement.  Of course, vagueness, com-
bined with voluntary compliance, weak self-enforcement, and little monitor-
ing enables organizations to take liberties where they might want to do so.  
After all, the benefits of seeking to present a lower implicit price prove pow-
erful, and the pledge offers loopholes. 
The vague pledges to inform, provide access to, and reassure donors 
about fund use would bare more teeth if associated with an independent, 
stronger, affirmative commitment to full candor by recipients.  Charities 
could pledge to achieve a new level of honesty.  Such an example exists in 
the obligations that some states have put onto higher education institutions in 
their communications with students and the public. 
These standards from higher-education regulation could inform refor-
mation of charitable solicitation.  Buying into an expensive education pro-
gram that promotes effectiveness in achieving student goals requires that in-
stitutions use the utmost care in providing information to prospective 
students.  One state offers language that could prove useful for incorporation 
in an additional article to the Donor Bill of Rights.  In Oregon, in order to 
obtain authorization to grant educational degrees, “[a] school shall be scru-
pulously ethical in all communication with the public and with prospective 
students.  School publications, advertisements, and statements shall be 
wholly accurate and in no way misleading.”305 
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Philanthropy groups should add something similar to the Donor Bill of 
Rights to reinforce the existing articles, which have already been long ac-
cepted, in principle: “A not-for profit organization shall be scrupulously eth-
ical in all communication with the public and with prospective donors.  Or-
ganization publications, advertisements, and statements shall be wholly 
accurate and in no way misleading.” 
This additional clause would require complete candor from charities 
about their use of funding—the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth.  “Scrupulously ethical” behavior is warranted from entities that receive 
preferential status in the tax code, and from those who solicit money to serve 
a public interest.  Ethical behavior alone might imply that a charity could be 
passive about eradicating any confusion.  Scrupulously ethical behavior, as 
this one Oregon rule requires, calls for more affirmative efforts to ensure that 
donors are completely informed. 
Organizations adopting and complying with a revised Donor Bill of 
Rights would have to communicate fungible use discretion, the true incre-
mental impact of a gift, and whether the represented activities have room for 
more funding.  Essentially, a charity would have an affirmative obligation to 
disclose with clarity how donations would be used.  One would expect that 
this might change the nature of solicitation, or it might change the nature of 
use.  The lead-ins with specific promises about use, followed by subsequent 
language that qualifies the promise as not carrying any commitment, would 
prove more difficult to make under this guideline.  Perhaps the most inexpen-
sive way to comply with a candor clause would be to declare conspicuously 
that the organization will put the money to best determined charitable use, 
consistent with the mission—without any confusing additional noise. 
Openness should not impose significantly higher compliance costs, but 
it might make lowering the implicit price of donations more challenging.  
Generally, some empirical studies show that restricting advertising infor-
mation raises consumer prices,306 but this proposal aims to increase infor-
mation, so the net impact on implicit pricing for charities may not be as clear.  
The perceived risks of charities misspending donated money should drop, 
however, and that dynamic could increase net donations.  Whatever the re-
sult, donors would be making decisions based on a set of information with 
more integrity behind it. 
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Further, if more charities play by these rules, and if donors know to look 
for charities that play by these rules, honest charities should benefit over char-
ities that decline to make the candor commitment.  In essence, a successful 
implementation of these reforms would enhance “the respect and trust” for 
philanthropy that the original Donor Bill of Rights drafters sought to promote 
in their preamble. 
Self-regulation and policing should serve charitable organizations well, 
avoiding compliance costs.  Watchdog groups could use an updated Donor 
Bill of Rights as a new measuring stick for rating charities and for general 
public education.  However, if still needed, adoption and proliferation of the 
Donor Bill of Rights could enhance opportunities for public enforcement. 
C.  The Last Resort: Additional Enforcement 
Regulation of charitable speech through formal rulemaking and enforce-
ment would prove expensive for the charitable institutions that the public 
wishes to support.307  However, the FTC and the states need not promulgate 
a candor rule for charitable solicitations and communications in order to en-
joy the desired effect.  The FTC and state attorneys general could, of course, 
put their moral weight behind this effort with some support and endorsement. 
Furthermore, if charities expressly adopt a revised Donor Bill of Rights, 
it could become a material claim.  Such a claim would require the charitable 
entity to incorporate its commitment to candor and scrupulously ethical com-
munications as a material, independent representation, the force of private 
and public law could follow.  Donors, the FTC, and attorneys general would 
have that extra hook of “failure to meet the candor representation,” if pursu-
ing enforcement.308  If policymakers firmly wished to push a candor commit-
ment, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) could require organizations to 
make and disclose their candor commitment in order to receive tax-exempt 
status—just as the IRS requires of tax-exempt organizations in other areas.309 
Of course, a heavy regulatory hand should not be used until private ap-
proaches have been exhausted, and even then, not without firm evidence of 
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the costs and benefits of regulation.310  More broadly, private philanthropy 
groups should draft and urge adoption of a revised Donor Bill of Rights that 
incorporates this proposed candor change.  Some entities will prove reluctant 
to restrain their normal fundraising practices, let alone increase their civil 
exposure through a candor rule.  So, the sector, in considering this proposal, 
would have a great deal to weigh. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The American charitable sector is a marvel, in size, impact, and social 
innovation.  Funding, particularly from individuals, provides lifeblood to the 
sector.  Also, charitable donations comprise a significant consumer transfer 
of wealth.  Given these factors, enhancing the integrity of charitable solicita-
tions, which drive a substantial amount of giving,311 should become a re-
newed priority for leaders in the charitable sector, and if necessary, for regu-
lators. 
When solicitations lower the implicit price of goods by obfuscating the 
true incremental impact of a donation, signals are distorted.  Donors purchase 
incremental charitable goods and services that they did not wish to purchase.  
Charities that do not obfuscate the use of donations lose out because their 
implicit price for the same charitable production would be higher.  In some 
instances, these problems are serious enough to warrant an analogy to com-
mon law fraud and misrepresentation. 
The information flow in charitable solicitation, and thus the impact of 
donation, can be improved along several key dimensions by a renewed com-
mitment to candor.  The charitable sector can lead the way by adopting and 
self-enforcing new practices, but government enforcement looms as a poten-
tial alternative.  Whichever path, the special position that charities hold 
should mean that they afford donors integrity that matches public trust. 
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